A Novel Approach to Emergence in Chemistry - Philosophy of Chemistry - page 46

s theory of emergence focuses on entities, it is at odds not only
with reductionism, but also with the causal closure or completeness of physics - the
thesis that “all physical events are determined (or have their chances determined)
entirely by prior physical events according to physical laws” (Papineau 1990 ,
p. 67). This is because on Hendry

Insofar as Hendry

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s view, molecules are capable of downward
causation. So if the theory of emergence advocated by Hendry is true, the set of
physical causes must be supplemented with sui generis chemical causes - mole-
cules exerting downward causation on their parts.
The rejection of the causal closure of physics entailed by the kind of ontological
emergence advocated by Broad and Hendry may be problematic. Some philoso-
phers argued that the causal closure of physics is supported by inductive arguments
based on the history of science (Papineau 2002 , see Appendix) or on conservation
laws (Vicente 2006 ). 8 One worry is that in a world in which all basic forces are
physical and the conservation of energy is respected, sui generis non-physical
forces (whatever this might mean) of the kind required to break the causal closure
of physics could not arise. Maybe this objection can be responded to, and maybe the
causal closure of physics is just another philosophical preconception of the
naturalistic-minded philosopher. Or maybe not. Regardless, it seems to me that it
would be preferable if the ontological autonomy of chemistry did not depend on a
theory of emergence which is committed to the falsity of the causal closure of
physics. This is another reason why it may be fruitful to approach emergence in
chemistry differently.
Scerri

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s view on the current state of affairs regarding emergence in chemistry is
that just as McLaughlin has failed to rule out emergence and downward causation,
so Hendry has failed to make a case in their favour. Scerri believes that the proper
attitude to adopt towards emergence and downward causation in chemistry is
agnosticism. Given the points I made earlier (about how the debate over the kind
of emergence defended by Hendry might require one to take a stand on the
interpretation of quantum mechanics, and about how the rejection of the causal
closure of physics that it entails might be at odds with the principle of the
conservation of energy), but also given what is at stake (namely the disciplinary
autonomy of chemistry), I think it is worth investigating alternate routes to emer-
gence. The rest of this paper sketches such a proposal.

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4.3 A Novel Approach: Functional Emergence

Before sketching the contours of a new approach to emergence in chemistry it
would be useful to state why such an account is desirable and what we want from
it. As mentioned in the introduction, developing accounts of emergence in chem-
istry is important because emergence can help us defend the ontological autonomy

8 For a different view, see Gibb ( 2010 ).