Chemistry Reference
In-Depth Information
the pluralistic proposal; his purpose consists in stressing that the appeal to
internalist realism (Putnam
1981
) is not sufficient, by itself, to justify the ontolog-
ical autonomy of the world of chemistry.
After appropriately reconstructing the theses of the original 2005 article, Manafu
accepts that there is no theory-independent ontology and admits the possible
coexistence of different conceptual schemes. However, according to him this is
not sufficient to conclude that two different conceptual schemes applying simulta-
neously to the same portion of “noumenal” reality will always define different
ontologies. He points out that, in order to draw this conclusion, one needs to argue
that the ontologies defined by different conceptual schemes have, in Quine
'
s terms,
the same “ontological rights” (Manafu
2013
, p. 227). In other words, it is necessary
to show that the various conceptual schemes are equally legitimate, none being
privileged over the others. However, this may not be the case in two different
situations. First, “[t]
wo different conceptual schemes may differ with respect to
their theoretical virtues
:
one may be simpler
,
more systematized
,
or it may have
more explanatory pow
er.” (Manafu
2013
, p. 227). In this situation, the ontologies
constituted by those conceptual schemes will also differ with respect to their
ontological rights. Second, “
conceptual schemes need not be logically independent
from one another. For example
,
if one conceptual scheme can be deduced from
another with the help of correspondence principles relating the terms of the two
theories
,[
]
the claim that different conceptual schemes define distinct ontologies
becomes problematic
” (Manafu
2013
, p. 227). It is quite clear that in this situation it
is not admissible to deny the ontological priority of one of the domains over the
other. On this basis, the author concludes that “
different conceptual schemes do not
always
(
or do not necessarily
)
define different ontologies
.” (Manafu
2013
, p. 226).
Strictly speaking, Manafu
...
s argument is completely correct, even with respect
to the Kantian-rooted ontological pluralism that improves the internalist position
of the original 2005 paper (see Lombardi and P
´
rez Ransanz
2012
). However, it
does not dismantle our pluralist conclusions about the relationship between
chemistry and physics. I will analyze separately each of the two situations
mentioned by the author.
Let us begin with the second situation considered by Manafu. Although it is true
that a relation of deduction between conceptual schemes blocks ontological auton-
omy, this is not the kind of relation that can be found in the chemistry-physics case.
Manafu
'
s argument takes the conclusion we draw in our original article (Lombardi
and Labarca
2005
) out of context. In fact, that work began by reviewing the broad
consensus among philosophers of chemistry about the epistemological irreducibility
of chemistry to quantum mechanics. And precisely on that basis we asserted that “[i]
f
chemical concepts could be epistemologically reduced to quantum concepts
,
there
would be a good reason to believe in the ontological reduction of the chemical world
to the ontology of quantum mechanics. But when the epistemological irreducibility of
chemistry is accepted
,
there is no argument other than metaphysical realism for
postulating ontological reduction
”(LombardiandLabarca
2005
, pp. 139-140).
'
