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the entailment or derivation itself is what Strevens calls the “follow-through”
representing the actual causal processes resulting in the target
s occurrence. The
kairetic account specifies a procedure for determining these causal difference-
makers. One begins with a detailed, veridical physical model of a given explanatory
target and the idea is to extract a more abstract model shorn of its causal irrele-
vances. If explanatorily irrelevant causal factors can be eliminated, or better if we
can remove some of the detail (for example, by replacing a parameter
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s definite
value by some bounded range of values), or optimized (maximally abstract, i.e. as
general as it can be) without invalidating the causal entailment of the explanandum,
then those factors are explanatorily irrelevant and hence play no part in our
understanding of the target phenomenon.
By following the kairetic procedure one ends up with an “explanatory kernel” - a
model in which all the factors are difference-makers (ibid, p. 88). Ultimately, the
aim of the kairetic procedure is what Strevens calls a “standalone explanation”
(ibid, p. 117). These models should be complete in the sense that none of the causal
difference-makers are missing, and cohesive in the sense that that they cite causally
contiguous factors, meaning that they do not include different kinds of causal
elements. This is one of the trickier desiderata of the kairetic account because it
requires a means to individuate relevantly similar causal elements. I will not be
concerned with this specific issue here, suffice to say that Strevens appeals to
the level of fundamental physics in order to individuate causal contiguity (see
pp. 104-109). Similarly, Strevens appeals to fundamental physics to cash out the
completeness of standalone explanations such that they issue in “deep” scientific
understanding. This commitment will be discussed below.
Both event and regularity explanation (the explanation of causal laws or
generalizations) evoke causal mechanisms because a mechanism which explains
a law also explains any instance of the law. And the kairetic procedure operates in
the same way in regularity explanation as it does in event explanation. Having
said that, regularity explanation requires some additional conceptual apparatus.
Strevens
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sense of “mechanism” is broad because it covers any causal difference-
making process and operates in roughly the following way: a causal law of the
form
If F
,
then G
expresses a causal connection between
F
-ness and
G
-ness,
whichisexplainedbycitingacausalmechanism upon which this connection
depends (ibid, pp. 222-223). A causal model explaining a law is essentially an
argument logically entailing all events instantiating the law to be explained (ibid,
p. 224). It consists of a causal model
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s follow through realised by any concrete
instance of the law, where the setup comprises “a specification of the particular
facts in virtue of which the process in question realises the schema” (ibid, p. 225).
One doesn
'
t explain a law or generalization itself by evoking a mechanism.
The explanatory target is usually the property
G
-ness, since one is providing a
mechanism - the difference-making process - that connects
F
-ness and
G
-ness.
Further, the explanation of a causal law or generalization by a mechanism schema
is essentially the explanation of the high-level properties of the generalization to
be explained by those of fundamental physical laws. However, providing a
mechanism is not a sufficient condition for explanation. One will invariably
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