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In-Depth Information
The key to my proposed rehabilitation of the reduction relation is twofold. In the
first place I argue that a reduction relation is best conceived as a logical
regimen-
tation
or
paraphrase
of what happens when we claim that one theory explains
another. Such a position has recently also been defended, from different points of
view, by Klein (
2009
), Fazekas (
2009
), Dizadji-Bahmani et al. (
2010
), and van Riel
(
2011
). A more detailed discussion is given in Hettema (
2012a
).
Secondly, I argue that such a regimentation must be capable of specifying the sort
of connections that obtain in the actual practice of science. I argue that that there are
several formal mechanisms compatible with the two criteria of the Nagelian scheme.
Belief revision is based on an outright relaxation of the notion of
'
derivation
'
,
and argues that the
of which Nagel speaks in his description
of the derivation criterion may be satisfied by a relaxed notion of
logical consequence
'
'
.In
this paper I will use a structuralist characterisation of the belief revision relation in
terms of the structuralist characterisation of
consequence
'
'
conceptual spaces
as advanced by
'
'
G¨rdenfors and Zenker (
2011
).
I conclude that with these logical moves a notion of Nagelian reductionism is to
a significant degree compatible with a pluralist model and a
,
though not with a world without any unity of science. My conclusion is that it is
possible to develop a notion of reduction that is sympathetic to chemistry on the one
hand and logically robust on the other. The lesson we may draw from this is that
there is not that much that divides reductionist and pluralist approaches in the
philosophy of chemistry. This conclusion, I believe, opens up the prospect of
fruitful new avenues of research in the philosophy of chemistry.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sect.
2.2
I briefly summarise the important
aspects of the Nagelian approach to reduction and some of the recent commentary on
this scheme. This development assists in setting the scene for the discussion to follow.
In Sect.
2.3
I develop my specific proposals and outline their consequences for a
conception of the unity of science. To provide an example of how this might work in
practice, I discuss how the proposed structure of reduction
qua
belief revision fits
Eyring
dappled world
'
'
s theory of absolute reaction rates in Sect.
2.4
. Section
2.5
is a conclusion.
'
2.2 How Liberal Can Nagelian Reduction Be?
As is well known, Nagel (
1961
) formulates two formal conditions on inter-theory
reduction, which can be summarised as the criterion of connectibility and the criterion
of derivability. The idea is that terms in the languages of the reducing and reduced
theory are connected, and that the laws of the reduced theory can be seen, under a correct
connection scheme, to be the logical consequences of the laws of the reducing theory.
However, while Nagel calls these conditions
formal
3
there is no formal logical
to be found in his description. As Dizadji-Bahmani et al. note, the
Nagelian model is not committed to a specific regimentation, but rather,
scheme
'
'
3
And separates them from a number of informal conditions which he also specifies in great detail.
