Chemistry Reference
In-Depth Information
and eighteenth century atomism remained a primarily speculative attempt at
conceptualizing the fundamental nature of matter. Even Newtonian atomism failed
to provide a satisfactory atomic theory that could serve as a foundation for exper-
imental predictions of chemical phenomena. Newton did refine early modern
atomism by introducing force as the means of interaction between particles.
However, although the notion of forces of interaction provided a theoretically
superior account of the relation between particles than the geometrical microstruc-
ture posited by Boyle, Newton still conceived of atoms in much the same manner as
Boyle had conceived of primary corpuscles. Newton
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s conception of atoms as the
most minute and impenetrable particles of matter is as speculative as earlier
attempts at conceptualizing elementary particles. Thus, as the century progressed,
it became increasingly clear that speculative atomism, whether vitalistic or mech-
anistic, “offered little [that was] of practical utility to chemists”
35
and that they
could easily dispense with these types of theories regarding the fundamental
nature of matter.
10.4 Lavoisier
s Rejection of Corpuscularian
and Atomistic Theories
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It is against this background of eighteenth century skepticism regarding speculative
theories of matter that the ideas of Antoine Lavoisier (1743-1794) must be
contextualized. A fundamental aspect of Lavoisier
s work was his rejection of
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corpuscularian and atomistic ontologies in favor of a
taxonomy of operationally defined chemical elements. For Lavoisier, the chemical
element is no longer the completely indivisible corpuscle (the philosophical atom)
or the
metaphysically suspect
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that is difficult to analyze by natural means. It is, instead,
that substance that remains as the last product of analysis. In the preface to his
Traite´E
´
l ´mentaire de Chimie
(1789), Lavoisier explains the general principle that
he proposes to apply in his chemical studies. He states, “just as in a child, it is ideas
that are the product of sensation, it is sensation that gives birth to an idea, so it is
for that individual who begins to undertake the study of the physical sciences: Ideas
must only arise as a consequence, as an immediate result of, an experience or a
sensation.”
36
For Lavoisier, since correct ideas can only arise from experience, a
priori notions that are contrived by the imagination or by the faculty of reason
unchecked can lead us into serious scientific error. To avoid such errors, claims
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chymical atom
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35
Hendry (
2006
), p. 865.
36
“De mˆme que dans l
enfant l
id´e est un effet de la sensation, que c
est la sensation qui fait
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naˆtre l
id´e; de mˆme aussi pour celui qui commence ` se livrer ` l
´tude des science physiques,
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les id´es ne doivent ˆtre qu
une
observation.” [Lavoisier, Antoine-Laurent,
Traite´E
´
l ´mentaire de Chimie
, Vol. 1 (Paris: 1789),
p. viii].
une cons´quence, une suite imm´diate d
une exp´rience ou d
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