Chemistry Reference
In-Depth Information
to realism she ably discusses in her topic. Similarly, the “blurring of the boundary”
refers to a hard boundary that is only there if one accepts the “standard view”
philosophy of science distinctions between theoretical and empirical. Similarly, her
invocation of boundary indicates buy-in to the demarcation of the standard view
s
“context of justification” vs “context of discovery” distinction, a distinction whose
absoluteness was successfully challenged over 50 years ago by philosophers and
sociologists of science.
There is a significant difference between theory and data, but it is better
characterized not as blurring, but as interaction: a mutual interdependence that
varies according to discipline, experimental setting and context. Decades of
research on the actual practice of science has sharpened the focus on the relation-
ship between data and theory: the relationship is a blur to the extent players have not
articulated the dynamics of their interaction. Neither Graves nor MacDonald is a
philosopher, so their use of philosophical terms pertaining to science are not always
consistent. However, this does not diminish the value of their collaboration and
documentation of an inquiry process that extends from a statement of research goals
to final publication of experimental research. Graves has demonstrated that the
blending of data, theory, model, interpretation and rhetoric occurs with some degree
of deliberation at every step. Regardless of the specific rhetorical theory one may
subscribe to, and regardless of which kind of realist or non-realist philosophy one
favors, it is clear that the practice of science involves tacit and fluctuating commit-
ments to both. Nowhere is their oscillation more explicit than in chemistry
'
s
'
bimodal definition of element.
9.7 Conclusion
Metaphor is not merely linguistic; it can also be deployed as a conceptual strategy
that disrupts fixation on any one of two or more explanatory frames that it brings
together. In the latter capacity, it enables thought to get on with the important
business of innovating something beyond the existing consensus on what, for
example,
is
an element, whether basic or simple; what
is
bonding; structure;
shape; etc. For example, Rom Harr´ has elaborated
24
the concept of natural
properties to express the notion of contingent, dispositional properties that are
especially in evidence in the practice of chemistry.
The substance-attribute metaphysics immanent in the chemistry of the past must give way
to metaphysics of spatially and temporally distributed causal powers to do justice to the
way chemistry now appears. The language of the foundations of chemistry must be a
language of tendencies and dispositions. (Harr´
2010
, 110)
Harr´
s examination of what he calls “chemical vernacular”, as opposed to the
specialized language of philosophers writing about chemistry, reveals a consistent
reliance on causal power of particular agents. Harr
´
calls for better alignment
'
24
Harr´
2010
, Causal concepts in chemical vernaculars.
Foundations of Chemistry
12:101-115
