Chemistry Reference
In-Depth Information
The
establishment
of “similarity sets” is a specialty of the metaphoric mode of
discourse. Kuhn notes that “[it] is sometimes (perhaps always) revealing to view
metaphor as creating or calling forth the similarities upon which its function
depends. With that position I very much agree”(Kuhn
1979
, 533). The process of
scientific education, as well as that of scientific discovery and invention, involves
just this kind of mental transmutation: a creation of categories by means of
elevating certain impressions from the realm of na
¨
ve realism into the realm of
scientific significance. Kuhn approaches this conception, finally dropping the
distinction between metaphor and metaphor-like processes, for the sake of brevity:
'
metaphor
'
refers to all those processes in which the juxtaposition either of terms or of
concrete examples calls forth a network of similarities which help to determine the way in
which
language attaches to the world
. (Kuhn
1979
, 539 emphasis added)
Whether or not Kuhn is aware of this (and there is no indication of this in his
writing), the idea of any
attachment
of language to the world itself is metaphorical.
Ernst Cassirer, on the other hand makes this an explicit claim that lies at the basis of
his
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms
. For Cassirer, the very act of speech, the act of
attaching thought to a medium that is fundamentally different from thought (i.e.,
sound) is itself an embodiment of metaphor, as one thing is made to stand for
another. Cassirer also notes that “radical” metaphors don't merely point out simi-
larities and dissimilarities,
they institute them
. This is one manner in which meta-
phorical commitment has practical, even material impact.
The question of how conceptual categories are first instituted is relevant to both
research and education. A recent study of the use of metaphor in science by
education researcher, Frederik Jeppsson and his co authors
17
makes three key
claims about the role of conceptual metaphor (CM) in scientific problem solving.
In the course of making these claims, the authors review much of the literature of
education theory on this topic and affirm a key point that is of interest to my
analysis: the question of whether experts and novices share conceptual strategies, or
employ distinct ones in solving scientific problems. Until recently the latter posi-
tion
18
was favored, but recent evidence arising from education research has pro-
vided support to the former position, represented in the work of Gupta et al.
For example, according to Gupta, novice and expert use similar conceptual
resources, but in addition to having a broader variety of CMs, experts have greater
flexibility
with regard to the ones they use. In their studies, Gupta et al. show that
both expert and novice use basic CMs drawn from everyday experience, often
reifying concepts or processes, for example, treating them as material substances in
the course of reasoning about them. Whatever may be the degree to which experts
use concrete metaphors instead of the “abstract” and “constraint-based”
19
ones
specific to a given disciplinary discourse, they switch seamlessly between CMs.
17
Fredrik Jeppsson et al. (
2013
) Exploring the Use of Conceptual Metaphors in Solving Problems
on Entropy,
Journal of the Learning Sciences
,
22
:
1
, 70-120.
18
See Jeppsson et al. (
2013
, 72).
19
Jeppsson et al. (
2013
, 72).
