Chemistry Reference
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contexts: the history and philosophy of chemistry, laboratory research practice,
and chemical education. The chapter concludes with a section on the specifically
chemical understanding of metaphor.
9.1 Metaphor in Science
The positive role of metaphor in science has been noted by philosophers,
historians of chemistry,
1
science education researchers and educators
2
where it
has often been hailed as a descriptive and explanatory device that stimulates and
shapes concept development. Several philosophers
3
have noted the ubiquity of
metaphor and proposed that
all
language is metaphorical. In his masterful treat-
ment of that act of metaphoring, philosopher Kuang-Ming Wu, presents an
extensive cross-cultural hermeneutical survey of the variety of attempts to define
metaphor. He finds all of them incomplete, though each one may be more or less
helpful regarding some aspect. Not so helpful are attempts to treat metaphor as
one among several figures of speech, and subsequent attempts to split hairs among
them. I follow Wu in his treatment of simile, metonymy and other non-literal
forms, as different kinds of metaphoric activity, for in order to achieve the effects
for which they are so often called upon,
all non
-
literal forms of language rely on
metaphoring
. It is most beneficial, therefore, to see metaphor as a general form of
communication activity, rather than as a specific linguistic formula that follows
specific rules.
4
Any attempt at hardening a definition of metaphor inevitably
cracks up as novel forms of expression and understanding naturally emerge
from cultural advancement.
Before moving on to discuss the specific case of metaphor in science, we
may bring these general considerations of metaphor and language full circle in
the context of Alfred North Whitehead
s “fallacy of the perfect dictionary.” Like
other fallacies Whitehead introduces in the course of his philosophical reflections
on science, this one points to the seemingly natural tendency of thought to capture
the dynamism of concrete reality in static abstractions. One who commits the
fallacy of the perfect dictionary misconceives both language and thought:
'
There is an insistent presupposition continually sterilizing philosophic thought. It is the
belief, the very natural belief, that mankind has consciously entertained all the fundamental
ideas which are applicable to its experience. Further it is held that human language, in
single words or in phrases, explicitly expresses these ideas. I will term this presupposition,
“The Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary.” (Whitehead
1938
, 173)
1
T. Nummedal (
2011
), Bensaude-Vincent and Stengers (
1996
), Newman and Principe (
1998
),
Dobbs (
2002
), Merchant (
1980
), and others.
2
Jeppsson et al. (
2013
), Aubusson et al. (
2006
), Tobin and Tippins (
1996
), Hofmann (
1990
) and others.
3
Black (
1962
), Cassirer (
1953
), Hesse (
1966
,
1988
), Harr´ and Martin (
1982
), among others.
4
This is, in fact, what Cassirer (
1953
) called “radical metaphor” and Kuhn (
1977
;
1979
) referred to
as “metaphor-like processes.” This theme is discussed in depth in Sects.
9.5
and
9.6
below.
