Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
troversy. Ultimately, the Corps hoped private interests would develop the Clarks Hill hy-
droelectric dam and storage reservoir, which would also “provide a minimum continuous
regulated flow” to enhance navigation downstream between Augusta and the port of Sa-
vannah. But in the end, Major Garlington recommended “that there be no participation by
the United States in the problems of irrigation and flood control” on the Savannah River,
that any power projects include navigation improvements, and finally, “that no improve-
ment of the Savannah River below Augusta be undertaken at the present time.” New South
enterprise and local municipalities successfully managed the river's flooding, droughts, and
energy needs while serving industrial and residential customers. In conclusion, the Corps'
engineers believed federal involvement in the Savannah River basin was “unwarranted”
and that the Corps of Engineers' services were unneeded. By this token, the Depression-era
Corps limited its own involvement in directly shaping the river basin for the second time
since Oberlin Carter's 1890 survey and in the wake of the Great Flood (1929).
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The Savannah River valley's power brokers who valued the Clarks Hill concept found
the Corps more relevant than the Corps found itself. In August 1935, about seven months
after the Corps released the
Report on the Savannah River
, Augusta's chamber of com-
merce mobilized the city's boosters to woo New Dealers and their federal dollars. Lester
S. Moody (1893-1972) had moved from Jacksonville, Florida, to Georgia in 1926, as-
sumed leadership of the Augusta Chamber of Commerce, and henceforth linked the river
to Augusta's economic future. He would later be anointed the “Father of Savannah River
formally asked FDR to appoint a PWA commission to reevaluate the 308 Report's findings.
Moody's cohort specifically wanted to revisit the Clarks Hill project's ability to deliver
multiple benefits such as “flood control, navigation, prevention of soil erosion, and power
his team refuted assertions made by Corps and Georgia Power Company officials about re-
gional energy needs. The boosters argued that Georgia and South Carolina actually faced a
future electrical deficit. Furthermore, Moody explained, the Georgia Power Company was
unlikely to complete Clarks Hill. Moody's faith in the Corps and skepticism of Georgia
Power were not without justification.
Between the Great Depression and the end of World War II, energy utilities all over the
nation faced an uncertain future and shrinking industrial service demand. Many companies
put hydroelectric power projects on hold for at least a decade or tabled plans indefinitely.
36
But a shifting economy also contributed to an energy transition and consumer behavior.
The Georgia Power Company continued to make use of the region's water after complet-
ing the well-publicized Tallulah-Tugaloo River projects in the early 1920s. For example,
the company's massive Atkinson fossil fuel plant on the Chattahoochee River seven miles
upstream of Atlanta placed the first of four units online in 1930. While the plant burned
