Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
more, depending on topography, a surveyor's skill, and the final agreement between sellers
and Corps real estate agents. Finally, and most important to understand, the Corps' collar
lands were (and are) public land and therefore open to general access. This final point made
the real estate investors and property owners apprehensive about purchasing land abutting
the collar or relinquishing ownership and riparian rights to land corralled within the buffer.
Most property owners and investors ultimately wanted to build docks and boathouses, clear
vegetation in the collar to improve the view, and enhance property values set to be further
inflated due to proximity to a massive taxpayer-funded artificial amenity lake. Could prop-
erty owners purchase or use the federal property in the buffer area between the water line
and a private property line to build a dock? Senator Thurmond's constituents inquired.
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According to one Corps officer, private property owners adjacent “to the project bound-
ary” had “the same rights as the general public in using the Government lands and access
to the water.” The general public, in turn, could also access the collar from the lake itself.
Corps officers also explained to Senator Thurmond that property owners could build float-
ing docks, walkways, access roads, and other structures in the buffer areas on a permit ap-
plication basis and as long as the improvements did not imply “exclusive use” or prevent
real estate investors were positioned to gain significant financial benefit from the reservoir,
and they supported the New Deal-inspired public works project because of the anticipated
private rewards that came with Sun Belt leisure activities in a postindustrial waterscape.
Promises to serve national defense, dreams for personal playgrounds, and the reported
trio of traditional benefits propelled Hartwell forward after 1950. These advocates—from
chamber of commerce secretaries and media personalities to lawyers and general contract-
ors who often landed lucrative federal construction contracts—functioned as cheerleaders
and Corps engineers believed that Hartwell was one of the federal government's most im-
portant Savannah River valley endeavors. Many people also understood that Hartwell was
a relic of the New Deal big dam consensus, and a crop of critics emerged to oppose the ven-
ture after Hartwell received its first dedicated appropriation. As with opposition to Clarks
Hill, a vocal group of conservative challengers opposed Hartwell when the project's costs
exploded and the Corps' plans threatened property and water rights.
The backlash mobilized along multiple fault lines. In 1951, the Clemson College (currently
known as Clemson University) board of trustees was anxious to learn how the Corps'
proposed Hartwell project might affect the school. Clemson commissioned alumni Cecil
L. Reid, A. G. Stanford, and Ed D. Sloan, and their internal report determined that the
Hartwell project threatened the college's future. Reid and Stanford were both engineers;
the latter worked for the Atlanta-based Robert and Company, an engineering outfit with
direct ties to World War II defense factory contracts (e.g., the Marietta, Georgia, Bell B29
