Cryptography Reference
In-Depth Information
Impact of the Variations of p . The optimal value of p for large N might not be
thesameasfor N = 1. In practice when
( p, 1 ) vary slowly with p (parameters
corresponding to encryption) the behavior of Proposition 3 can be extended to
the workfactor and, as long as N is not too large, we have
T
ISD ( n,r,w )= WF ISD ( n,r,w )
1
2
w − p
r − 1 w−p− 1
2
WF ( N )
where γ ≈
0 . 721
(10)
N γ
where p and 1 are the optimal parameters of the algorithm when N =1.For
parameters corresponding to digital signature and hash function, the algorithm
does not seem to take full benefit of multiple instances.
Tabl e 5. Decoding N instances
log 2 N p WF ( N )
( n, r, w )
observed γ expected γ
ISD
(4096 , 540 , 45)
0
12 60 128 . 4
(4096 , 540 , 45)
40
12 80 110 . 5
0 . 4486
0 . 4487
(4096 , 540 , 45) 83 . 7 10 94
91 . 6
0 . 4398
0 . 4487
(2048 , 352 , 32)
0
6 30
81 . 0
(2048 , 352 , 32)
40
7 54
63 . 4
0 . 4403
0 . 4394
(2048 , 352 , 32) 51 . 4 7 60
58 . 8
0 . 4324
0 . 4394
(2 20 , 180 , 11)
0
10 94
87 . 8
(2 20 , 180 , 11)
40
6 79
79 . 6
0 . 2038
0 . 4856
(2 20 , 180 , 11)
70 . 3 4 76
74 . 6
0 . 1875
0 . 4856
(2 21 , 1024 , 256)
0
16 144 144 . 0
(2 21 , 1024 , 256)
40
6 79 141 . 5
0 . 0640
0 . 2724
(2 21 , 1024 , 256) 117 . 6 4 76 137 . 1
0 . 0597
0 . 2724
5.3 Unlimited Number of Instances
We assume that the attacker can let N grow indefinitely. Because any algorithm
must at least read its input there is a limit to the growth of N . By “unlimited”
we mean that the attacker has reached this limit (whatever it is). We will denote
WF ( )
ISD ( n,r,w )=min
N,p, T N ( p, )
and we wish to compare this cost with WF ISD ( n,r,w ). The best strategy for the
attacker is to take a number of instances equal to
= min 2 r , w
1
ε ( p, ) k +
p
N =
r−
w−p
k +
p
in which case (assuming K 0 = 0, see the discussion in
§
5.1) the complexity is
T ( p, )= 2 K 1 K 2
K 3
2 ε ( p, )
ε ( p, ) +
 
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