Cryptography Reference
In-Depth Information
Table 2. Time to solve the MinRank problem for Square+ for varying embedding
degree , but fixed field size q = 31, field extension n = 17, and plus equations p =5.
Each line is based on 11 independent experiments. We see that the running time does
not depend on the embedding degree
.
time [sec]
q
n
p
min
avg
max
0
1590.59
1610.13
1630.91
1
1580.85
1605.42
1624.17
2
1563.80
1600.54
1616.89
3
1587.97
1603.67
1628.78
31
17
5
4
1557.96
1604.47
1626.03
5
1567.56
1610.80
1636.44
6
1584.20
1606.61
1622.34
7
1573.56
1604.07
1621.94
8
1583.91
1609.04
1629.97
9
1575.46
1603.57
1624.08
10
1565.71
1597.58
1618.23
We start with Schorr's method. It uses the following observation: For given
rank r , each sub-matrix of size ( r +1)
( r + 1) must have determinant zero.
Hence, each such determinant gives rise to one equation of degree ( r +1). For a
( τ × τ )-matrix, we can form
×
r +1 2 sub-matrices (selecting r +1 rows and columns,
respectively) and hence equations. Assuming that a suciently high proportion
of them is linearly independent, we are able to solve the corresponding system
of equations by linearization. In our case, we have r =1and τ := ( n + + p )
τ
free variables, leading to a total of n + + 2 degree 2 monomials. For + p<n ,
this allows to compute a solution in n + + p
2
3
O ( n 6 ) computations over
F q n +
and is hence polynomial in all security parameters. For the proposed parameters
n =48 , =3 ,p = 5 we obtain a total workload of
2 31 . 77
and have hence
broken the scheme.
For the second method, we inspect the kernel of the matrix H . Remember
that each kernel element ω
n
q n +
F
has the form ω := SM n + (0 , ω 2 ,...,
ω n + )
˜
for
ω i
F q n +
and 2
i
( n + ). So randomly sampling vectors ω
R
q n + needs q n + trials on average to find a kernel element of H and is hence
exponential in the security parameters n, . It is also impractical for the proposed
parameters. Thus we use the more refined technique from Levy-dit-Vehel et al.
[12] to solve instances of the MinRank problem. In a nutshell, they do not sample
vectors ω but calculate them. This is done by generating an overdetermined
n
F
-
system and then solving it with Gröbner base techniques. Note that the attack
complexity grows exponentially with the rank of the target matrix. However, as
this rank is fixed to 1 in our case, we are not concerned by this.
The dimension of the kernel of H is ( n
MQ
1) in the extension field and thus
we can fix all but one coecient of ω at random and still expect a solution.
The corresponding vector therefore becomes ( ω 1 ,...,ω n 1 ,x )with ω i
F q n +
 
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