Cryptography Reference
In-Depth Information
9356433725290818322063237477659539960679619018282576265414797224176810239
4461794720293192639
e=10738975467716313016226411982616063375096935280096973378820148373901000
0377470313772198875565203421763473641679025697618732906800200949388901714
4337965064160547094535922354431198904536464821168309068889027430457499760
1091047270120113110989646463412317973823604744394241847030235719949845268
584917833408071651
d=34120427819749165542258873630680243843885206912393395291704730575235416
8499010091359026204518569891972265492221968149078409284214574471096638649
6508925391380739896819274937783290922865761442395151744157771365693061239
9916291158832430035510226908257536825863178385774457780384766899733604450
9358887363459579267
Doubly enciphered signed message:
Ü¡… ??-au¡?(dRc(µß¶s«ÙáàóR.K>; ¸> ÿÍSE-ÌC9B ¿cd_øT»%ìß?{ ŒW9
Q
n
1
⁄
2
?Á?‡ü¿/CH30ôÜ
Áµ?)ÙjÁ™<R-1@øA
£µ ù¯{èüÜ\±by|© -R,ÙèYpL0â?Sú Ò Æôs22!H
3
ˆÕ
a
KP
Ë)´ ã¬-
1
⁄
4
áœ1«%Q
¶v
2
y E=ùu-¸Zcê™7ß-
ëkû Õ ŸÛf¨--P ú
pR MY9@/+
MÓíË x
a
=z}©xÅG âñ
a
B Yå
´
YÀè
Ñqp
?± _?W
1
⁄
2
ÍúŸæœ p
†™1
Doubly deciphered signed message:
Little Willy Willy won't GO HOME!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Signing with Rabin
Rabin signatures are simple to produce. Suppose individual A
P
wants to send a message
to individual B using Rabin in such a way so that B knows the
message could only have come from A. Suppose A uses the Rabin modulus
n
pq
=
, while
*
. (The primes involved now are all congruent to 3 modulo 4, as required by
Rabin.) Of course, neither party knows the other's private key. A does the following:
1.
n
*
=
p
*
q
B uses
A computes a square root of
P
modulo
n
(if
P
has such a square root); that is, she com-
putes a value, say
C
1
, such that
C
1
2
P
(mod
n
).
This transformation can produce up to four roots; it doesn't matter which root she chooses.
(No one else can do this if A is protecting her primes
p
and
q
, as computing a square root
modulo
n
without its prime factorization is an intractable problem.)
Note that a particular message may not have a square root modulo
n
. The sender
must salt the message (or salt each block) in such a way that the salted result has a square
root modulo
n
. This isn't difficult, because the odds of some random integer having a
square root modulo
n
is quite likely. The amount of salt to use for this purpose is agreed
on beforehand.
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