INSTRUMENTAL CORRECTIONS FOR A DEFINITION OF CYBERWAR - Cyberwar-Netwar: Security in the Information Age - page 21

Fig. 6. Business cyberwar battlefield
But the military information infrastructure cannot be constructed on completely
distinctive principles, inasmuch as:
x If the State starts to place military orders among national companies, then the
same companies will be used which act in the market and, no doubt, the same
principal decisions will be applied
x Interoperability must be guaranteed both for military information infrastructure
and for the global information infrastructure, i.e., medium, target and weapon of
cyberattack
x Otherwise, sooner or later, military ICT or decisions in any case will be pushed to
the market
This implies firstly, that theoretical principles, which were incorporated in the
foundation of the new cyberwar-oriented technological decisions, will always be under
the steadfast attention of potential enemies who will always endeavour to forestall
investigations. We cannot reject this credible hypothesis only on a basis of moral
principle, and what is more, we have to recognize that against such a policy there is only
one technological principle - good security of the information infrastructure. Secondly,
the cyberdeterrence mission does not have a place within all three kinds of cyberwar in
consequence of their aggressive designs.
In this connection, for principal corrections of a conception of cyberwar, a new
conception is introduced into practice which we have named 'latent cyberwar'.
Indeed, the S-curve has shown us that developed states have to accept the inevitability
of competition in the market of cyberwar-oriented ICT, inasmuch as developing
countries, the potential partners, foreign R&D organizations, security services, etc., will