INSTRUMENTAL CORRECTIONS FOR A DEFINITION OF CYBERWAR - Cyberwar-Netwar: Security in the Information Age - page 19

countries in this connection have fewer information vulnerabilities, particularly those
where the population has not lost the habit of 'sleeping on the land'.
There are two alternatives relative to attitudes to such countries; ignoring or training.
The famous phenomenon of digital divide demands consideration of the vulnerability
of developed States, as well as the possibility of cyberconflicts which can arise on a basis
of heterogeneousness of social development in these States. That is why the training of
such nations seems to be a more provident programme. But even this programme does
not secure the developed states against asymmetrical wars, inasmuch as ideological,
religious or ethical thinking can play a major role; we are in a 'vicious circle'.
Besides, there are enough States with transition economies which have a social instinct
of learning modern ICT and the appropriate R&D without assistance and these States can
very quickly achieve a theoretical level of developed states. By the way, those states with
transition economies very often are used as the sources of 'brain drain'.
The first and second cases formulate a common problem for developed States; how to
reach an absolutely safe level of opening technological information without creating risks
of losing information superiority?
We assert that in Internet conditions, this problem has no decision at all, and the only
problem is achieving control superiority. The cyber-deterrence mission can only be used
as a deterrence mission, and this deterrence mission can be provided by only one
weapon: the demonstration of control superiority within the information infrastructure of
any potential enemy. That is why we have to define what information operations or ICT
can be demonstrated, and how our control superiority can be guaranteed within a fixed
time. We think that the answer will be found only by means of regular instrumental
corrections of a definition of cyberwar.
ISO/IEC 15408-1, 'Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation', helps us to make a first step in this direction by changing some slots within
the common definitions of threats; namely, owners, threats and assets by slots of States,
cyberattacks and cybertargets accordingly.
After this step we have to carry out an instrumental correcting of cybertargets. The
information systems are such cybertargets in an information environment, according to
the definition of IO. Therefore, we need definitions of the information system and
information environment. The information system is defined by the DOD Directive S-
3600.1 as 'the entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that collect,
process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information' and more recently,
Joint Publication 1-02 3 defines this term as 'the organized collection, processing,
transmission, and dissemination of information, in accordance with defined procedures,
whether automated or manual. In information warfare, this includes the entire
infrastructure, organization, and components that collect, process, store, transmit,
display, disseminate, and action information' (citation from open source
www.dtic.mil/mctl/) .
The 'Joint Vision 2020' interprets this conception as 'the aggregate of individuals,
organizations, and systems that collect, process, or disseminate information, including
the information itself'. But this definition is not useful for us in view of its excusable
universality. That is why the second step of clarification of cybertargets will be
connected with a more instrumental vision, namely, with the Shannon's channel model
and the reference model by the ISO (OSI ISO).
There are two main factors, the 'New Generation Networks' (NGN) and new
information resources that we examine by these models. The concept of the NGN will