INSTRUMENTAL CORRECTIONS FOR A DEFINITION OF CYBERWAR - Cyberwar-Netwar: Security in the Information Age - page 18

software and protocols and can subsist or live in cyberspace to protect the special IO
against an adversary information infrastructure without being detected (in-joke, they are
sometimes called "well-educated viruses") .
The intellectual agents will have an opportunity to influence not only objects of an
adversary information infrastructure, but also decision-makers and operators, directly or
indirectly, by means of special psychological technologies in human-computer interfaces
(HCI). The standard set of today's psychological operations (PSYOP) - propaganda,
agitation, misinformation, discredit and indirect threatening - will be extended with the
help of a synthesis of human-oriented and computer-oriented technologies, or so-called
'psycho-technologies'.
NLP-DHE, behaviour modification, subliminal technologies, neuroinfluencing and
mind control are psycho-technologies that can be considered as potential candidates for
inclusion in a list of future PSYOP. We have used the word potential, because many of
them are disputable today, but tomorrow they could become industrially very prospective
ones. In this connection we have to stress that the purposeful exploitation of the IO
demands elaboration of criteria and measures of effectiveness (MOE) for every
information operation at every level of detailing.
This question was well investigated by MOE SIG, which published their conclusions
in an open paper 22 , stressing the importance of the MOE and recommending the
interpretation of the MOE as 'a qualitative or quantitative measure used for prediction of
the effectiveness of alternatives or assessment of results towards achieving an objective.'
By the way, a paper 23 indicates that at the present time 'human elements' in IO are
very weak (at today's glance of course) which once more can explain why previously we
used the word potential for future psycho-technologies. Moral and ethical problems of
using psycho-technologies will arise, of course. We would, however, prefer to refrain
from discussing these aspects in this paper.
We would like in conclusion of this paragraph to emphasize particular qualities of an
interception, a kind of IO in a form of passive reconnaissance of adversary information
flows. The interception, by definition, and likewise a secret agent cannot at all be
detected; it would not otherwise be an interception. This particular quality explains a
vacuum under an interception in Fig. 5 and once more leads us to the thought that only
intellectual agents have the capability to be active and remain incognito while carrying
out their functions including interception.
“One should not increase, beyond what is necessary, the number of entities required to
explain cyberspace”. Occam's e-Razor
7. INSTRUMENTAL CORRECTING OF A DEFINITION OF CYBERWAR
IO as a core of cyberwar has to be an important component of a national military
doctrine and a possible means of constant national influence during the whole period
from peace to crisis, and, particularly, in cyberconflict. We suppose that in this
connection a cyberwar should be understood as a deterrence mission in the same way as
nuclear deterrence.
This statement of course is much more relevant to information-dependent States with a
developed information infrastructure and where the population has acquired a social
instinct for using information services 'with cause and without cause'. The developing