INSTRUMENTAL CORRECTIONS FOR A DEFINITION OF CYBERWAR - Cyberwar-Netwar: Security in the Information Age - page 14

To avoid the phenomenon of delay, while the basic tendency (S-curve) rises up to
saturation, the authors of the system should theoretically develop the existing system so
that its second inflection point will coincide with the first inflection point of a new
system, thus ensuring constant development of the basic tendency of cyberwar. But, in
fact, the authors and investors are a source of the 'phenomenon of delay' and for
developing a new system the authors need new information and not only from open
sources.
For instance, virus systems are today playing the role of such new technologies, and
have a big impact on the S-curve of cyberwar. As a result the second stage of
development of the conception of cyberwar may be named as 'virus-war'.
At the same time, the concept of the Semantic-Web today is very swiftly developing.
This conception includes intellectual agents, the requirement of uniform identification,
description and processing of information objects and services, as well as the use of
meta-data for providing efficient information searching.
That is why we have reasons to consider a next cyberwar as an 'agent-war'.
Unfortunately, the time limitation does not give us the possibilities to investigate all
attendant circumstances of these tendencies. That is why we cannot predict the period of
saturation and shall refer to it conditionally at a later time.
The examples above let us assert that any future new technological concept can
radically change a situation within the present investigations and, accordingly, within the
cyberwar-oriented market. That is why responsible analysts of cyberwar must be able to
instantly warn responsible State agencies and investors about times when additional
investments into present elaborations will not keep up information superiority. If they
will not do so, such analysis will be made by the adversary, who will develop an
asymmetrical cyberwar 'on the bones' of the competitor.
That is why, if we want to get the practical meaning of the S-curve, we have to
organize the alliances of friendly authors-competitors, to analyze the limits of their
technologies and coordination of deviation from the basic tendency of the cyberwar S-
curve. Otherwise, somebody else, perhaps, with lesser experience, can deliberately
investigate the off-the-shelf technologies and results of R&D, and then create prototypes
of new alternative technologies with higher parameters, which will create for this person
the conditions for his own information and control superiority.
By the way, the US already applies a very similar policy of alliances, of course in
more State-oriented directions; this is the 'The Joint Reserve Component Virtual
Information Operations Organization» (JRVIO)' with the witty slogan 'Cyber Warriors
Just a Click Away'.
On the basis of the reasoning presented above, we now shall try to present a possible
multi-step State policy concerning a cyberwar-oriented market, and explain this policy by
means of features of the cyberwar S-curve in accordance with fig. 4.
We think that the start-point of cyberwar's S-curve has historical interest only today.
The second period - development of the basic tendency of cyberwar - is more attractive
for our investigations. We can refer to the beginning of a cyberwar-oriented market as a
first point of inflection. After this first inflection, the holders of cyberwar assets may
consider selling cyberwar-oriented technologies and systems to potential partners as a
more useful action than protecting them.
The main purpose is to obtain a long period of assured knowledge about methods and
quality of possible cyberattacks from the side of these potential partners. No doubt this is
one way of achieving information superiority. By and large, the practice of a war market