Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
detailing and legitimizing it. Incidentally, the problem of IP-interception is not decided in
the ENFOPOL and still needs solving.
Indeed, cyber-intrusions can be directed not only for achieving information superiority
but also for finding an opportunity to control the adversary information infrastructure by
means of control interception.
More rough methods of control interception are destruction and modification of an
adversary's information infrastructure. Destruction is a very understandable term, and
modification is distortion and restructuring of the quantitative and qualitative
information; for example, data or priorities in match vectors or efficiency estimation
vectors in databases. The more delicate methods of control interception can change the
inference engines and facts in knowledge bases.
It is well known that data is aggregated 'bottom-up' in information flows in centralized
management systems; therefore problem-solving processes on lower and higher authority
levels differ. Obviously, the mass character of use of these information flows does not
allow the detection of these changes of information quickly and adequately enough. In
these cases, the control interception within information infrastructure becomes more
dangerous than the information interception.
The reasoning above allows us to assert, that the problem of control interception
within information systems and resources is more important in modern conditions than
the problem of the information interception. Ideally, the correct realization of control
interception completely deprives the potential adversary of any chances of providing not
only asymmetric wars, but also any wars at all, with the exception of using cavalry. That
is why the purpose of cyberwar is not destruction but control interception of information
resources, systems and channels, which can be formally expressed as a process of
changing of adversary control vectors according to the attacker's reference vectors. Thus,
the modern information systems in cyberspace will be attacked with purposes not only
for the destruction of information in the adversary information infrastructure but also for
the control interception. Moreover, there are a lot of leaders on different levels of
hierarchy in any centralized system. That is why falsification or changing information in
the process of decision-making is very efficient in cyberwar, when these leaders are
dependent on network information systems directly or indirectly.
The potential technological capability of the control interception can be considered as
political control superiority in the Information Age. Therefore we think that the control
superiority threat makes cyberwars more humane than any traditional wars. However, we
have considered three classes of cyberwar: the limited cyberwar, the unrestricted
cyberwar and cyberwar as an adjunct to military operations. Which kind of cyberwar
gravitates towards using control interception to a greater or lesser extent? And next, the
secret services play a very important role in investigation and identification of
cybertargets - information systems or persons - before realization of cyberattacks.
Therefore the questions arise: may we qualify these actions as cyberwar, and, as well,
when and how can cyberwar be used - from time to time, constantly or suddenly?
The next threat we face may indeed be from terrorists, but it could also be a cyberwar.
Donald Rumsfeld
Search WWH ::




Custom Search