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alleged to have “punished” Spain for its initial support of the Iraq
invasion but made it quite clear that Spain wanted nothing more to
do with that enterprise, although maintaining a NATO commitment
in Afghanistan.
Spain's ambivalence over the question of Islamic terrorism was
increased by a steadily mounting flow of illegal immigrants into Span-
ish territory. Spain's geographical location as the closest part of the
European Union to North Africa had long made it a favorite entry point
for foreigners seeking to make their way across the Mediterranean.
Some of these crossing the Strait of Gibraltar on improvised rafts sought
to move north of the Pyrenees, but others were content to remain in
Spain and establish an economic foothold for themselves. By the year
2006, more that 100,000 “refugees” had opened a new flank in the
informal invasion by landing on the Canary Islands and demanding
accommodation on the mainland. Although some originated in distant
countries and had made their way with great exertion to the borders of
Spain, many were North African Muslims who represented a potential
complication to the already vexed state of affairs. Some commentators
pointed out that a demographic shift was in process. The birthrate
among the traditional population of Spaniards was in decline and the
number of “exotic” residents in the country was rising. Although this
phenomenon was clearly discernible in a number of other European
countries, Spain's position on the “borderlands” of Western civilization
made its situation particularly disturbing.
Although the ongoing quarrel between Spain and ETA had presented
an alternate scenario to explain the Madrid train bombing of 2004,
Basque terrorism had quickly been discarded by most Spaniards in
favor of an Islamic source. A few conservatives continued to insist that
ETA had at least worked in conjunction with Muslim militants. Their
theories evaporated in 2005 when ETA made a sweeping proposal for
a cease-fire and negotiations with the Madrid government. Prime Min-
ister Rodriquez Zapatero responded with initial caution but then
showed himself more receptive to the proposal. Little actual progress
toward serious discussion of the Basque question could take place dur-
ing 2006 because various Basque political groups weighed in with com-
plex points involving Basque “nationhood” and even suggestions that
France had to be involved in any discussion because part of the Basque
homeland lay within France. Further complications were presented by
Catalan nationalists who were not to be outdone in seeking even greater
special status concessions for their nationality within Spain than had
already been granted in previous concessions. Spanish nationalists, ever
on guard against separatism, were quick to warn against creeping ero-
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