HISTORICAL DICTIONARY A–Z - Spain and Portugal: A Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present - page 373

cial relationship intact grew out of inevita-
ble friction with Morocco. Geographical
proximity, centuries of alternating trade
and warfare, and the remnants of colonial-
ism represented by the enclaves of C EUTA
and M ELILLA were perennial irritants.
When King Hassan II of Morocco was suc-
ceeded by his son Mohammed VI in 2000,
Spain's condolences and expressions of
goodwill eased tensions, but its insistence
that the enclaves had never actually
belonged to Morocco and inflammatory
rhetoric on both sides of the Strait of
Gibraltar kept bad feelings alive. So, too,
did attempts by would-be immigrants to
enter Europe via Ceuta and Melilla or by
improvised boats crossing the Mediterra-
nean. Many Muslims died in these attempts
or were captured and expelled from Span-
ish territory. Even those who succeeded in
finding sanctuary were often obliged to live
in poor conditions and to experience more
discrimination from ordinary Spaniards
than from the Madrid authorities.
Disputes with Morocco would continue
with periodic flare-ups over such incidents
as rival claims to ownership of a small Med-
iterranean island and increasing attempts
by would-be immigrants (both North Afri-
can and sub-Saharan) to force their way
into the Spanish coastal enclaves. Far more
worrisome was the Spanish decision to join
the coalition that the United States formed
in 2003 to invade Iraq and depose a regime
accused of gathering weapons of mass
destruction. By dispatching a brigade of
Spanish troops to Iraq, Prime Minister J OSÉ
M ARÍA A ZNAR provoked widespread dem-
onstrations in Spain and alienated public
opinion throughout the Islamic world.
Unfazed by these reactions, Aznar insisted
that Spain must join in a war on “global

terrorism” and linked the what was now
being termed Islamic terrorism to the ongo-
ing political violence in Spain that the
Basque terrorists of ETA had been waging
for decades (see B ASQUE NATIONALISM ) . In
March 2004, on the eve of a parliamentary
election that was expected to provide a
renewed mandate for Aznar's Popular Party
and place his hand-picked successor in
office despite all the protests against current
policies, a shocking act of terrorism struck
the Spanish capital. A number of commuter
trains approaching Madrid's main railroad
terminal were almost simultaneously the
target of bombs concealed on board. Nearly
200 people were killed, and hundreds more,
injured. The initial reaction of Aznar's
administration was to point the finger of
guilt at ETA. Public opinion was over-
whelmingly against this charge and was
furthermore convinced that the regime was
lying in order to win the election. The
results of the vote were, first of all, the vic-
tory of an opposition coalition headed by
the Socialists and, secondly, the new gov-
ernment's decision to withdraw Spanish
troops from Iraq.
Aznar's successor, Prime Minister J OSÉ
L UIS R ODRÍGUEZ Z APATERO , had always
opposed Madrid's alliance with Washington
and took this as an opportunity to bring the
troops home. Some Spaniards, while not
enthusiastic about membership in the coali-
tion, complained that Zapatero's decision
represented cowardice in the face of terror-
ism, especially after Islamic sources claimed
that the Madrid train bombings were,
indeed, a “punishment” for Aznar's affilia-
tion with U.S. president George W. Bush.
Spain's international position should not be
determined, these commentators argued,
by either fear or favor but by rational and