HABSBURG SPAIN - Spain and Portugal: A Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present - page 20

constituted the political and economic stronghold of the kingdom.
Under such leadership, all was arranged to perpetuate a situation that
favored the elite, and nothing could be undertaken by way of reform
that threatened the status quo. The cortes of Castile, once capable of
influencing royal decisions, were routinely ignored, while the ancient
realms of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia (which still preserved certain
rights even after the harsh rule of Philip II) were unable to influence
events. An outsider himself in Castile, Lerma spent the greater part of
the reign placating his Castilian colleagues and shielding his royal mas-
ter from disturbing truths. Little changed after Lerma was finally cast
out of office, for the king had become accustomed to confiding the
affairs of state to others. In his last months on the throne he dedicated
himself not to the rehabilitation of Spain, but to the renewal of war in
the Netherlands (upon the expiration of the truce) and involvement in
the politico-religious adventures of his Austrian Habsburg kinsmen
who had launched a war against the German Protestant princes. Even
a belated state visit to Portugal, long disillusioned with Spanish over-
lordship, was mishandled. Philip antagonized many of the key figures
in his western realm, preparing the way for the secession that lay ahead.
On the way home from this hapless expedition he fell ill. Still a com-
paratively young man, he sensed that he would not recover. But even
in the classic deathbed advice to his heir, Philip III failed to offer more
than platitudes, the more sensible of which would be ignored as soon
as he was gone. Thus ended the reign of Philip III, who was not truly a
failure, for he had attempted virtually nothing.
The signs of decay and disarray, already evident during the reign of
Philip III, became desperately clear as Philip IV began his long tenure.
More aggressive and self-confident than his father, he was little more
clear headed and competent, with the result that the business of gov-
ernment was soon confided to the management of another favorite.
This minister, the count of Olivares, was made of stronger stuff than
Lerma, for he was both intelligent and energetic. Furthermore, as a
high-ranking nobleman of Andalusia, he had no fear of the Castilian
aristocrats and did not avoid confrontations with them as had his Valen-
cian predecessor. Unfortunately both Olivares and the king shared an
unrealistic view of Spain's greatness in the world and of its ability to
project power. Neither monarch nor minister ever fully understood the
limitations imposed upon Spain by its internal political and economic
weakness. In true Castilian fashion they relied on miracles to carry the
day in a succession of crises that by any rational standard should have
been avoided or dealt with through negotiation and compromise. Both
men, immortalized in numerous paintings by Diego Velázquez, display