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Although he, too, exercised dictatorial pow-
ers in this one-party state with its rubber-
stamp parliament, Caetano made occasional
gestures toward political reform and domes-
tic public opinion. But he was as much the
captive of his circumstances as the rest of
the population. Salazar, the doctrinaire
professor who had created the “New State”
of Portugal had chosen this fellow aca-
demic as his deputy because he lacked the
cunning and ruthlessness to challenge
him. For that very reason Caetano was
incapable of making more than weak ges-
tures toward reform. Having no personal
base of support, he was obliged to accept
the assurances of the elite among war
ministry generals and staff officers who
enjoyed the privileges of L ISBON that they
could see the light at the end of the tun-
nel. Contingent after contingent of young
men sailed off to Africa, and Caetano
repeated the bland assurances of his pre-
decessor and his advisers.
Yet dissent was growing, and not only
among the civilian population, as they paid
an ever-higher price in blood and treasure.
Conscripts and young officers were also
complaining about the endless marches
through jungles and swamps, the fruitless
struggle against elusive guerrilla forces who
enjoyed the support of “liberation move-
ments” in neighboring countries, and the
bombardments and burnings they were
ordered to inflict upon the civilian popula-
tion. Even in the higher ranks field com-
manders were beginning to speak out
against a war that had no end in sight. By
spring 1974 the blood and venom had
flowed back to Portugal itself. The armed
forces movement had emerged among cap-
tains and majors disgusted with the corrup-
tion of their superiors, both civilian and
military. Many of these young men shared
the radical perspectives of banned leftist
parties, including the Communists. Their
plan was, however, for a nonviolent revo-
lution. Key units stationed in Lisbon and
other cities were ready to act, and a system
of signals and a plan of action emphasizing
rapidity of movement as well as an appeal
to peaceful patriotism were agreed upon.
On April 25, 1974, radio stations began
broadcasting coded messages, often in the
form of popular songs containing meta-
phorical allusions. Detachments of troops
moved to designated government buildings
and took charge of operations there. Key
government officials, including senior offi-
cers at the army headquarters were placed
under arrest. The entire seizure of control
passed off without violence or opposition.
Members of the government were described
as surrendering almost wearily, as if the
inevitable had arrived. Armed soldiers
posted at key points in Lisbon were cheered
by civilians, many of whom placed flowers
in their rifle barrels as a gesture of goodwill
and a symbol of the fact that no shots had
been fired. Such scenes gave the nickname
“the Carnation Revolution” to the fall of
the dictatorship.
Caetano and his principal associates were
detained for a time but eventually were
allowed to go quietly into retirement. Gen-
eral A NTÓNIO DE S PINOLA , an outspoken
critic of the war who had secretly signaled
his support to the revolutionaries, took the
lead of a provisional government. Negotia-
tions were soon opened to end the fighting
in Africa and to grant independence to the
colonies. Portugal would still have many
problems to solve in the years ahead, but
with the Carnation Revolution it had taken
the first steps on the road to democracy.
 
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