Surviving the second tsunami - Rebuilding After Disasters: From Emergency to Sustainability - page 138

Traditional landholders are seldom able to do so. Where they did have
any such records of continuous possession of the land, in many instances
these records were swept away in the tsunami (see 6, below), which left
them much more vulnerable to other claims to the land, whether legal
or fabricated.
Public authorities such as ministries of forests, parks, fisheries or
harbours would often use the tragic removal of people from the land
as a means, finally and more easily, to enforce the existing laws against
habitation in specific protected areas of land, such as mangrove forests
and national parks.
Another form of dispute concerns inheritance. This was particularly
the case under Syariah Courts in Indonesia, and it was a central issue of
women's rights to land. The most common land disputes involved com-
plex inheritance issues. '[T]he sheer number of deaths means land-related
inheritance cases still constitute the predominant form of land-related
conflict after the tsunami.' 9
3 Threats of violence (land grabs) . The story that introduced this chapter
indicates the nature of land grabs at their most personal and threatening.
There are other levels, both less personal and less violent, but the results
are the same. One example is the occupation of land while the former
landholders are absent and living in a relief camp. While the former land-
holders are away, the invading land grabber - often a corporation - will
erect barbed-wire fencing around the land and post armed guards around
it to ensure that the former residents cannot return to occupy it.
Another form of threat of violence is the military. As with any disaster,
the national military forces are called upon to assist in rescue operations,
clean-up, the building of relief camps and, often, the rebuilding of hous-
ing and infrastructure. In the conflict areas of Indonesia and Sri Lanka,
the presence of the military is itself seen as a threat. The Indonesian
military (TNI) had imposed martial law between 1989 and 1998. It was
reimposed in 2003-2004. The day before the tsunami struck, the TNI
had killed 18 guerrillas in Aceh. More than 3000 had been killed since
the imposition of martial law in May of 2003. 17 Before the tsunami hit,
the civilian population was terrorized by the TNI and was justifiably
fearful and suspicious of any of their actions. The military, on the other
side, viewed all Acehnese as likely members of the Free Aceh Movement
(GAM). These attitudes had a significant effect on the relief efforts and
reduced the flow of aid because it was seen as 'forming new supply lines
for rebels in the hills'. 17 Under such circumstances, for many Acehnese,
returning quickly to their land to reclaim it became a larger nightmare.
4 Development (higher economic return) . A statement made by the Tourist
Board of Sri Lanka typifies the development response to the tsunami:
'In a cruel twist of fate, nature has presented Sri Lanka with a unique
opportunity, and out of this great tragedy will come a world class tourism
destination.' 19 Land, in other words, is viewed as being cleared of people