Civil Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
of New Orleans. Approximately 50 ULI members from both the public and
private sectors spent one week studying all aspects of the situation there.
On November 18, 2005, they made preliminary (and very controversial)
recommendations on the city's overall recovery.
At a well-attended public meeting, the team presented their findings and
recommendations. They suggested shrinking the city's footprint to match
a reduced residential base and approaching redevelopment in a phased
manner.
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They warned of the “Jack-o'-Lantern” effect (where the pattern
of rebuilding will be erratic in areas of uncontrolled redevelopment). They
stressed the need to strategically plan for a potentially slow repopulation
and suggested the conversion of heavily damaged neighborhoods into open
space/retention ponds/nature reserves. They also called for the formation of
a powerful development authority to oversee and direct key recovery efforts.
None of their recommendations, although based on sound professional
judgment, were seriously considered by either elected officials or the general
public. In fact, they were firmly and adamantly rejected.
On November 28, 2005, the mayor declared his intention to “rebuild
all of New Orleans” by adopting a market-driven approach to redevelop-
ment/repopulation. In keeping with this concept, the City of New Orleans'
Department of Safety and Permits continued to issue building permits
city-wide, applying great latitude in certifying a structure's degree of damage.
Negotiated assessments were made on a structure-by-structure basis with
the overall intent of reducing the estimate to below 50 per cent so structures
could be renovated and their owners would not be forced to rebuild from
scratch.
On January 11, 2006, recommendations and an overview of the BNOB
Commission's plan were presented by the mayor, Land Use chair Joseph
Canizaro, and Canizaro's handpicked planning consultant, John Beckman, a
principal of Wallace Roberts and Todd, a Philadelphia-based firm with years
of experience in dealing with various aspects of New Orleans' growth and
development. Specific recommendations of the BNOB Commission included
the following: areas with little or no flooding would be open for redevelop-
ment/repopulation immediately; a four-month building-permit moratorium
would be imposed on flooded neighborhoods; an extensive light-rail transit
system would form the city's organizing framework; and a powerful develop-
ment authority, the Crescent City Recovery Corporation, with broad and vast
powers, would be created to oversee the city's redevelopment. In addition,
all 13 planning districts, including 73 separate neighborhoods, would be
required to prepare individual development plans within four months. This
imposed yet another impossible scope of work and deadline. Integral to the
BNOB Commission's plan was a mandate that each neighborhood demon-
strate their viability - i.e. prove to the City that their residents and businesses
would come back. The BNOB Commission and the City Administration
also assumed that FEMA would provide the funds necessary to secure the
technical assistance needed to develop the neighborhood recovery plans
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