Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
undoubtedly acted as incentive for companies to over-log their concessions. Log-
ging companies, reportedly, concentrated on a few very valuable species (Essama-
Nssah et al. 2002). They dug roads inside the forest to access sought-after trees
and thus opened forest areas to individual settlers and bush meat hunters. Al-
though section 23 of the1981 law, and section 8 of the 1983 Decree clearly stipu-
lated that the exploitation of any forest shall be subject to a prior inventory of the
zone by the services in charge of forestry, this was to a large extent never re-
spected. Worst still, government subsequently relied on inventory of private indi-
viduals or companies with vested interest in forest exploitation. Their results could
not be trusted (Essama-Nssah et al. 2002).
There was also a policy requirement that 60% of all timber products be proc-
essed locally. Some stakeholders contend that the short period for which conces-
sions were awarded and the high capital cost involved in sawmill investment cre-
ated incentives for companies to use old and cheaper machinery, leading to
inefficiency at a rate of about 75% wastage (Ndenecho 2005; O'Halloran and Fer-
rer 1997). Also, throughout the 1980s, the government paid no attention to com-
munity forest management or to fostering any sense of partnership as a mechanism
to enhance protection and sustainability of its forest resources or to ensure that the
local elite did not capture the benefits intended for the local communities. Fur-
thermore, the Ministry of Agriculture lacked the administrative capacity to ensure
that the receipts from taxes were shared with local communities. Worse still, forest
sector policy was subservient to the development of the country's agricultural sec-
tor.
With respect to the forestry fiscal system, it could be said that although it was
used to boost government revenues, it was equally an indirect instrument of regu-
lation, albeit a weak one. Four major taxes were in force in Cameroon. These in-
cluded a surface area tax at 98 CFA francs per hectare per year and a Stumpage
tax fixed at 5% of the value of a cubic meter of wood. This value depended on the
species and the origin of the log (to account for transport costs). The value of the
log, however, was set administratively below market value. Besides, government
relied on the loggers' declarations with respect to the volume and the origin. This
information led to low revenues being collected. There was also an export tax, a
flat tax at 20% of an administratively estimated value of the log. This source ac-
counted for about 75% of the total tax amount collected from the forest sector.
This tax created distortions to the extent that processed wood was exempted, thus
reinforcing the inefficiencies of the sawmill sub-sector by providing it a high level
of protection. Finally, there was a specific forest export tax set at 10%, aimed at
discouraging log export (Essama-Nssah and Gockowski 2000). Generally, the
situation prior to the current reform was characterized by lack of adequate legal
and planning frameworks, a concession system that encouraged rent-seeking be-
haviours and inefficiency, and a tax system designed to protect an inefficient sec-
tor.
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