Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
The saving grace, however, is that even when India acquires the technical,
human, infrastructural and organizational competence to ready its forces rapidly
in anticipation of an adversary's first strike, it will still lack the political
incentives to initiate nuclear first use. More importantly, so long as its nuclear
weaponry is more effective for countervalue rather than counterforce missions, it
will continue to lack the logical incentives to engage even in preemptive strikes,
despite the possible background condition of conventional deterrence breakdown.
Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that as long as India does not possess
a true sea-based nuclear deterrent, its currently desired strategic posture—a force-
in-being—can endure despite the many variations in reconstitution and readiness
timelines that are likely to become visible in the years ahead.
THE FUTURE OF THE 'FORCE-IN-BEING'
The configuration of the force-in-being described above allows India to affirm—
consistent with its doctrine—that its nuclear capabilities represent political rather
than military instruments, while at the same time remaining tools that can be
mutated into weapons of mass destruction if the strategic circumstances so
warrant. The force-in-being also lends itself to being
transformed
into a more
robust and formidable posture, like a ready arsenal, if India's strategic
environment demands such a response over time. This transformation would in
fact be likely:
• if China emerged as a true superpower in the future and, as a result of its
changed status, dramatically expanded its strategic nuclear capabilities
and
transformed the current conventional balance
vis-à-vis
India to New Delhi's
disadvantage;
• if Sino-Indian competition intensified over time as a result of growing national
capabilities in both states and if the resulting struggle for power were to
generate a high-intensity contest for influence in the middle eastern, southern,
and southeastern rimlands of the Asian continent;
• if Sino-American relations were perceived in New Delhi as taking the form of
coercive collusion manifested either through joint efforts at 'ganging up'
against India on political-strategic issues, or through greater displays of laxity
toward Pakistani efforts at increasing its strategic capabilities through
proscribed international transactions; or
• if international politics were once again to radically change course and move
in the direction of greater nuclearization and even stronger forms of
dependence on nuclear weapons for ensuring order and security.
If such circumstances came to pass, the Indian nuclear posture would change and
could evolve into something resembling a traditional arsenal. In fact, the genius
