Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
FIGURE 10 INDIA'S LIKELY COMMAND SYSTEM EVENTUALLY
aspire to institutionalize this model currently, they are nevertheless likely to
reach it once their present development and acquisition plans in the nuclear realm
come to fruition.
Although this will take a decade (if not more) to be fully realized, the
capabilities that they will have acquired by then will simply allow for the
institutionalization of such a command system; it is also not unreasonable to
believe that by this point, the current international pressures which make for
restraint will have abated somewhat, or at least reduced in intensity, as the world
grows progressively used to the idea that nuclear weapons in the Indian
subcontinent are here to stay. Under such circumstances, the willingness of
India's security managers to countenance increasing the rate at which their force-
in-being can be reconstituted in the face of imminent threats will also intensify.
Even at this point though, it is important to remember that India's nuclear
deterrent will still remain a force-in-being rather than a ready arsenal, assuming
that no untoward perturbations occur in the interim.
It is obvious that as India moves towards the institutionalization of such a
command posture over time it
could
gradually acquire the capability for first
strikes in a crisis, something that was
irrevocably
ruled out so long as the baseline
command model illustrated in
Figure 5
remained operational. This development
could become a source of concern to India's adversaries and, if not managed
appropriately, could even become subversive of crisis stability.
