Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
FIGURE 9 INDIA'S LIKELY COMMAND SYSTEM IN A HIGH-THREAT
SCENARIO
arrangements that will enable it to integrate its weapons systems and generate the
requisite increases in readiness either before, during, or after conventional
deterrence breakdown with the intent of possessing more or less ready nuclear
forces even before it absorbs what may be the first of many sequential nuclear
attacks on India.
The ability to rapidly alert, relocate, integrate, and ready a larger and more
diverse nuclear force even before absorbing a first strike is a capability that
Indian security managers will eventually strive for, mostly for prudential reasons
deriving from the belief that possessing the option for rapid response is, other
things being equal, better for both deterrence of adversaries and reassurance of
the national leadership. In this final model of command predicated by the posture
of a force-in-being, the actual Indian retaliation after suffering a nuclear attack may
still not be instantaneous, since the retaliatory response time here will be
determined in large part by the extent of damage suffered as result of the
adversary's attack. Yet, this command model holds the best promise of allowing
Indian security managers to unleash their retaliatory response within a few hours
of suffering an attack as opposed to the many-hours-to-a-few-days delay that is
inherent in the initial 'baseline' model of Figure 5 .
The command system illustrated in Figure 10 thus remains the model that the
Indian nuclear deterrent will eventually conform to, although policymakers in
New Delhi will not publicly articulate this conception today. Even if they do not
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