Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
FIGURE 8 INDIA'S LIKELY COMMAND SYSTEM IN A LOW-THREAT SCENARIO
If these new institutional arrangements come to fruition in the best imaginable
forms, they could pave the way for greater integration of the military in the
command function as well over time. Whether this, in fact, occurs eventually
will depend on the following circumstances. First, what Pakistan and China do in
the interim, since the nuclear force structures, technologies and doctrines
gradually becoming visible in these countries may force India to modify its
preferred approaches to the management of nuclear weaponry.
102
Second, the
kind of delivery systems, that India itself acquires over time, since the shift
towards a sea-based deterrent will of necessity transform the force-in-being into
something resembling a ready arsenal and, accordingly, will require new
methods of management which are closer to the military's preferences than those
encoded in the baseline model of control described earlier.
Despite the fact that India's civilian leaders take a different view of the role of
nuclear weapons than do many in the military, concerns expressed by military
officers about survivability, readiness, and the need to prepare seriously for
nuclear operations
in extremis,
however, are not lost on India's senior security
managers. Consequently, it is likely that the 'baseline' command system
illustrated in
Figure 5
will actually mutate considerably to accommodate different
strategic circumstances.
Figure 8
illustrates one possible metamorphosis from the
'baseline' model and suggests how the Indian command system is likely to
respond—within the parameters of the basic framework pertaining to the force-
in-being—to contingencies that arise within a low-threat scenario.
