Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
civilians, in the form of the DAE and the DRDO, would retain control, either
jointly or separately, over the fissile core and the non-nuclear weapons assembly
respectively, while the uniformed military would be responsible for maintaining
and stowing the delivery vehicle and potentially maintaining some non-nuclear
weapons components.
In this 'baseline' model, the integration and delivery of New Delhi's nuclear
weapons does not occur
except after India has suffered a nuclear
attack
.
Integration, which in this context refers to the many steps involved in mating of
the fissile core with the weapons assembly and the delivery vehicle, may involve
all the custodial groups converging at the assembly sites directly or, more likely,
would require meeting at some intermediate locations.
In either case, the role of the military increases disproportionately at this
juncture, since orchestrating the transportation of the various strategic components,
together with their custodians, at certain assured levels of security will be a
demanding task that is matched only by the military's own exigent obligation to
prepare the delivery systems in their custody for prospective nuclear operations—
all this occurring amidst the carnage of prior nuclear attacks and, possibly, an
ongoing conventional war.
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The last task in the sequence consists of the delivery of completed nuclear
weapons to their targets. This stage marks the point when civilian contributions
essentially come to an end as military operators alone are competent to execute
the mission of carrying out the retaliatory strikes. Extensive preplanning will be
required to ensure that the delivery vehicles can be moved to bases near the
designated assembly areas: under the 'baseline' model, such activities can be
initiated even before actual deterrence breakdown occurs.
Figure 6
illustrates schematically how such a command system could be—and
perhaps historically has been—operationalized in practice. This illustration is
based both on the impressionistic descriptions found throughout in Perkovich's
India's Nuclear Bomb
and Chengappa's
Weapons
of Peace,
supplemented by
several off-the-record conversations with civilian decision makers and senior
military officers in New Delhi.
As
Figure 6
illustrates, the orders to integrate India's nuclear assets in
preparation for a retaliatory response can be issued only by the Prime Minister,
who may choose to consult as necessary the President of the Republic of India
and the Cabinet Committee on Security. Once the decision to prepare India's
nuclear weapons for retaliation is reached, the Prime Minister can order the
Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre and, through them, the various points of contact at other
Department of Atomic Energy facilities where nuclear components may be
stored, to prepare their distributed assets for integration.
Through the civilian Minister of Defence—and possibly even directly—a
parallel set of orders can be issued, first, to the Secretary, Defense Research and
