Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
security of the nuclear force, that is, its resistance to efforts by unauthorized
individuals to acquire custody of the weaponry and discharge them without
legitimate sanction. Dealing with this problem remains the province of the
control system which regulates both the patterns of custody surrounding nuclear
weapons and the extent of autonomy enjoyed by their custodians with respect to
the issue of legitimate use.
The challenges arising out of these issues have traditionally been termed the
dilemma of 'positive' and 'negative' control. As Peter Feaver summarized it,
positive control refers to the fact that 'leaders want a high assurance that the
weapons will always work when directed',
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while negative control refers to the
equally high degree of reassurance sought by the national leadership that 'the
weapons will never be used in the absence of authorized direction'.
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Since
positive and negative control have to be accomplished simultaneously, there has
always been a certain degree of tension between these two demands as the
requirements of safety could undercut the requirements of survivability and vice
versa. These safety-survivability tradeoffs have traditionally resulted in the
development of various kinds of innovations intended to simultaneously
safeguard nuclear weapons while preserving their effectiveness.
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The United States, for example, operating on the premise that achieving
successful nuclear deterrence against a revisionist power like the Soviet Union was
a difficult and demanding task, attempted to resolve the dilemma by a
combination of technical and organizational solutions which always sought to
ensure that a sufficient number of nuclear weapons would remain constantly
available and ready for instant use even after absorbing a Soviet first strike. To
ensure ready availability—or, in other words, continuing positive control—the
United States developed an elaborately dispersed force, where ready nuclear
weapons were deployed on board a multiplicity of platforms, like land-based
missiles, submarines and bombers.
Because this solution essentially implied that the uniformed services had
completed nuclear weapons
(at varying levels of readiness) in their possession at
all times, the problems of negative control—that is, the prevention of mistaken
or unauthorized use—became a critical issue. The United States addressed this
challenge through a combination of technical responses and organizational
innovations—all of which were designed to forestall unauthorized use even
while the force as a whole remained constantly ready to respond to a nuclear
attack.
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The overall command system then was biased in the direction of
positive control, and this tendency was reflected most conspicuously by the
highly 'delegative'
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patterns of authority under which the military enjoyed a
high degree of autonomy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons in their
possession.
The control system in the case of India would be biased in exactly the opposite
direction because New Delhi's strategic requirements are very different from
