Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
routines that pertain to the rapid movement of military equipment in an
emergency.
All strategic solutions to the problem of survivability involve tradeoffs, and
the Indian concept of a distributed force-in-being is no exception. The critical
weakness of this posture is not its susceptibility to accidents—because completed
nuclear weapons would not exist as such in peacetime—but rather its potential
inability to effectively reconstitute in the aftermath of a nuclear attack in order to
carry out retaliation. While it is difficult to imagine any successful damage-
limiting strikes conducted by either China or Pakistan simply because of the ratio
of potential targets-to-weapons involved, not to mention the intelligence
requirements needed to support such strikes, it ought to be recognized that such
eventualities are possible, at least theoretically, and that they could impose great
burdens on the Indian capacity to retaliate.
Should this outcome obtain, it is obvious that India's efforts at ensuring the
survivability of its nuclear capabilities were less-than-effective to begin with.
This is a risk, however, that Indian decision makers seem willing to take for three
reasons: first, because the requirements for successful disarming strikes are
deemed to be so gigantic as to render them beyond the pale of possibility in the
real world, especially in the context of India's competition with China and
Pakistan; 71 second, because neither Pakistan nor China has demonstrated either
the technical capabilities or the doctrinal interest in executing damaging-limiting
first strikes as a matter of operational policy; 72 third, because the circumstances
under which Indian nuclear weapons use becomes realistic is so remote that the
risk of being unable to reconstitute effectively becomes a secondary problem,
given New Delhi's more pressing interest in assuring the safety of its weaponry,
minimizing the costs of its arsenal, and maintaining continual civilian control
over all its strategic assets. 73
What makes a difference in the end is that India does not seek to deter
formidable nuclear powers like the United States and Russia, merely lesser
adversaries like China and Pakistan. Even in these instances, nuclear weapons do
not represent New Delhi's first line of defense but remain merely political
instruments of deterrence and reassurance which acquire effectiveness because
the devastation that could be caused by even one of India's modest weapons would
be far greater than any of the benefits sought by its adversaries through war.
Given these realities, the risk of being unable to reconstitute a overwhelming
retaliatory response because of an excessively distributed force-in-being is
something that New Delhi can live with.
Centralized in Control
As indicated above, the issue of survivability constitutes only one of the many
challenges facing an emerging nuclear power. Among other critical issues is the
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