Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
the level of destruction thought to be sufficient for successful deterrence is
relatively small and generally centers around the ability to destroy 8-15 target
complexes in China and Pakistan, even though precisely what constitutes
destruction may vary from analyst to analyst. Many accept a certain redundancy
in capabilities to allow for reliability constraints, attrition as a result of first
strikes, and delivery failures, yet none argue for a force posture that is in any way
automatically or consistently keyed to the size and character of the adversaries'
nuclear capabilities.
In all probability, however, most decisions about the size of India's nuclear
arsenal will be made ultimately on considerations
other than
merely operational
requirements
. It is, in fact, almost likely that the size of the nuclear weapons
stockpile will be defined eventually by the quantum of fissile materials available
to India—and not necessarily by the size of the target set defined by India's
numerous security commentators. Similarly, the yield of the nuclear weapons
themselves will be determined fundamentally by the designs that Indian
scientists have been able to validate thus far or appear to have the greatest
preference for—and not necessarily by the demands imposed as a result of the
technical characteristics of the target array.
This by itself should not be surprising because India's political leadership does
not
seek to create a large and complex nuclear arsenal, even if its scientific
community yearns to push the envelope with respect to more and more
sophisticated weapons designs. Further, the principal criterion for strategic
adequacy in Indian eyes is not that the damage inflicted by its weapons ought to
be greater than that which can be inflicted by an adversary, but only that the
costs resulting from Indian retaliation ought to be greater than any political
benefits accruing to the adversary as a result of its nuclear threats or first use.
The requirements for effective deterrence in the Indian context are thus truly
low because state managers in New Delhi have already concluded that there are
very few political benefits which could be secured by any adversary through
aggression—with or without nuclear weapons—against India. Given this
generally modest criterion of strategic adequacy, even small numbers of
relatively low-yield fission bombs could suffice to provide India with the
deterrence it desires.
Although India's nuclear force may therefore be defined eventually more by
technical limitations and political constraints rather than by strict operational
requirements, Indian policymakers today believe that prudence requires that they
keep all their options open. On this issue, both the government of India and
security élites within the country at large appear to be of one mind. Both groups
are agreed that India's strategic policies with respect to matters affecting the size
and quality of its future deterrent ought to have three components.
First, India should not foreclose any possibilities unless the payoffs from
foreclosure incontrovertibly exceed the costs. In practical terms, this implies that
