Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
possible attrition of these assets are taken into account. General V.N.Sharma, a
former Indian Army Chief of Staff, for example, 'believes that around 50 bombs
should do, but calls for 'going the whole hog' in delivery systems'.
43
In sharp contrast to these more moderate estimates, Bharat Karnad has argued
that strategic sufficiency for India cannot consist of anything less than the ability
to interdict ~60 primary and secondary targets in China and Pakistan and,
accordingly, demands a nuclear force of well over 300 weapons by the year 2030
—most of which must be high yield thermonuclear devices.
44
While the size of the weapons inventory has received some attention, the
number of desired delivery systems has not been specified in comparable detail
in Indian discussions thus far. In part, this is because deducing the minimal
numbers of delivery vehicles necessary requires complex operations research and
analysis as well as prior knowledge of many variables like basing modes, relative
hardness and mobility, and estimates of success accruing to deception and
denial. The kind of delivery system chosen also affects the final force size: while
ballistic and cruise missiles, which are single-use vehicles, would correlate with
their nuclear payloads in a one-to-one relationship, strike aircraft, being reusable,
do not lend themselves to such a simple metric for force sizing.
The lower penetrative capacity of aircraft can increase the gross numbers
required, and complex planning tools are therefore necessary if good estimates of
operational requirements are to be derived. Given the lack of access to such
planning tools, it is not surprising that various Indian commentators have
advanced different estimates of the delivery systems required to carry their
preferred inventory.
In 1994, K.Subrahmanyam argued that his force of about 60 nuclear weapons
be carried on 20 Prithvi SRBMs, 20 Agni intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs), and the rest on strike aircraft.
45
Two years later, Sundarji, in contrast,
argued for a force of ~150 warheads carried on 45 Prithvi SRBMs and 90 Agni
IRBMs, with the balance carried by aircraft.
46
Vijai Nair has argued for at least 5
SSBNs, in order to maintain 48 SLBMs ready at all times for use against China
and Pakistan, in addition to 36 SRBMs and IRBMs and various other unspecified
numbers of manned aircraft.
47
And, in the most expansive version of all, Bharat Karnad has argued for a
force of 4 SSBNs contributing a total of 48 SLBMs, 25 intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), 40 IRBMs, and 70 manned aircraft, all to be complemented by
another 70 air-to-surface missiles and 25 atomic demolition munitions.
48
The
exact nature of the calculations leading up to these force architectures is not
known.
49
Despite the lack of consensus among commentators, there are some interesting
similarities between these estimates. All posit essentially finite arsenals, that is,
weapons inventories and delivery systems that do not inexorably grow in size
once the ability to service certain destruction requirements is assured. Further,
