Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
six metropolitan centers including port facilities; one corps sized offensive
formation in its concentration area; three sets of bottlenecks in the strategic
communications network; five nuclear capable military airfields; two
hydroelectric water storage dams. A total of 17 nuclear engagements.
34
Vis-à-vis
China, a superior nuclear adversary, Nair argues that India ought to
focus on large punishing strikes that would retard postwar Chinese capabilities
relative to its other adversaries. This implies that India would need a weapons
capability able to pull out 'five to six major industrial centers, plus two ports, to
service China's strategic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet. This makes a total of
eight nuclear strikes'.
35
Against such a target array, Nair argues that
the ideal configuration of warhead numbers and yield would be: two
strikes of one megaton each for metropolitan centres and port facilities;
two strikes of 15 kiloton (kt) each for battlefield targets; one strike with a
yield of between 200 and 500 kt each for dams; one strike of 20 to 50 kt
each for military airfields; and one strike each of 15 kt for strategic
communication centres.
36
After reliability parameters are factored in, at the rate of two weapons for each
autonomous strike, with 20 per cent of the entire force structure maintained as a
postwar reserve, the 25 designated targets in China and Pakistan are calculated as
requiring an overall Indian arsenal of 132 weapons of varying size and yield.
37
Other commentators have also offered similar, though sometimes less
detailed, assessments. General K.Sundarji, for example, has concluded that against
a small country like Pakistan 'up to 1 MTE [megaton equivalent] (say 50 x 20 kt
weapons) might do. Even for deterring a large country, one is most unlikely to
require more than 4 MTE'.
38
These totals are difficult to translate into specific
numbers of weapons because the design yields of India's nuclear weaponry are
not publicly known. Sundarji suggests, however, that targeting 15 conurbations
in both Pakistan (5) and China (10) should suffice for minimal deterrence: each
of these targets could be attacked with 'three fission warheads of 20 kt each,
detonated as low airbursts',
39
and from this requirement he deduces that India
'would need 45 warheads (and their delivery means) to survive an adversary first
strike'.
40
These numbers are explicitly based on weapons designs producing nominal
yields in the ~20 kt range, and after factoring in reliability parameters and
possible losses to an adversary's first strike, Sundarji concludes that 'a low
estimate of 90 weapons and an upper estimate of 135 weapons would be
reasonable'.
41
K.Subrahmanyam too argues for a comparable class of numbers:
in 1994, he declared that India needed only '60 deliverable warheads'
42
which, in
practice, probably meant some larger number if the reliability quotient and the
