Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
engendered by the Western debate, namely, 'how much is enough?' for purposes
of both deterrence and stability.
This question exercised Western strategists greatly during the Cold War and a
variety of sophisticated analytical techniques were developed in an effort to
address this issue satisfactorily.
26
While a consensus solution ultimately proved
elusive, at least the framework governing the solution became clear: the number
of nuclear weapons deemed to be sufficient were a complex function of the type,
yield and reliability of the weapons themselves and the number of targets needed
to be held at risk, this last variable being affected, in turn, by the number, types
and reliability of the weapons possessed by the adversary and the nuclear
strategy it was expected to pursue.
27
Indian security managers have not thus far defined their requirements with
respect to any of these issues publicly, and they will probably never define these
requirements openly in the future. But, while the upper and lower bounds of
India's strategic requirements are unknown, what is clear is that New Delhi
believes successful 'deterrence is not dependent on matching weapon to weapon,
but [rather, hinges] on the ability to retaliate with a residual capability'.
28
This position is obviously borrowed from the writings of K. Subrahmanyam
who, in response to the US demand for a quantification of India's deterrent, has
argued that 'minimum deterrence is not a numerical definition but a strategic
approach. If a country is in a position to have a survivable arsenal, which is seen
as capable of exacting an unacceptable penalty in retaliation, it has a minimum
deterrence [as] opposed to an open-ended one aimed at matching the adversary's
arsenals in numerical terms'.
29
This notion that minimum deterrence is a
strategic approach, and hence beyond quantification, has been criticized
vehemently by other Indian analysts, however, who note that 'for deterrence to
be credible, it has ultimately to be based on numbers'.
30
Such criticisms overlook the subtlety of the official Indian position. Clearly,
both Subrahmanyam and India's security managers amply recognize that
deterrence, in the final analysis,
is
about numbers: the numbers of weapons that
are possessed by India, the numbers of weapons that can survive a first strike, the
numbers of weapons that could be successfully carried to and detonated on
target, and the numbers of weapons required to wreak unacceptable damage on
an adversary who threatens Indian security.
What they are attempting to suggest, therefore, through their claims that
deterrence is not about numbers, is that the number of nuclear weapons judged to
be essential to Indian security is not something they are willing to disclose either
to their own body politic, or to their adversaries, or to any other interested
interlocutors like the United States. In part, this response is conditioned by the
fact that they cannot be certain today what their eventual stockpile of fissile
materials and the quality of their future nuclear weapons designs would look
like.
