Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
Ireland, indicate that seemingly intractable disputes can be resolved, or
ameliorated, by patience, outside encouragement, and, above all, a strategy that
will address the many dimensions of these complex disputes. If a strategy for
Kashmir had begun in the early or mid-1980s, then some of the crises that arose
later in that decade might have been averted, and it would not now be seen as
one of the world's nuclear flash-points.
Any comprehensive solution to the Kashmir problem would involve many
concessions, and changes in relations between India and Pakistan (and within
each state) It would require a change in India's federal system; it might require
changes within Kashmir between its constituent parts; it would necessitate a re-
examination of the military balance between India and Pakistan and provisions
that would prevent the two states from again turning to arms in Kashmir. Above
all, it would require major concessions on the part of Pakistan—and India might
have to accept a Pakistani
locus
standi
in Kashmir itself.
There also would have to be incentives for Pakistan to cooperate in such
ameliorative measures, since its basic strategy is to draw outsiders into the region
and to pressure India. In brief, India has to demonstrate to Pakistan that it would
be willing to make significant concessions, but also pledge that if Pakistan
ceased its support for Kashmiri separatists Delhi would not change its mind once
the situation in the Valley had become more normal.
Doing nothing is likely to be the default option for Kashmir. At best, there
might be an arrangement that would ensure that the state does not trigger a larger
war between the two countries. However, this does little to address Kashmiri
grievances or the widespread human rights violations in the state, nor does it
address the deeper conflict between India and Pakistan.
Both India and Pakistan regularly pass through a point where both sides
momentarily agree that the time may be right for talks. Just as regularly, one or
the other side decides that the risk of moving forward is too great. Often, they
believe that time will be on their side, and delay will weaken the case of the
other side or strengthen its own. To some degree, both sides also believe that the
other will not compromise unless confronted by overwhelming force. The
greater Kashmir problem is persuading both sides—and now the Kashmiris
themselves (whose perception of how time will bring about an acceptable
solution is not clear at all)—to examine their own deeper assumptions about how
to bring the other to the bargaining table and reach an agreement, and to
objectively assess the costs incurred by waiting to address a problem that has
crippled both states for over 50 years.
RESOLUTION OR PERMANENT HOSTILITY?
The presence of a paired minority conflict implies that sustaining a dialogue that
leads to regional peace will be difficult. It does not imply that war is more likely.
