Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
disputes.
20
Meetings between Indians and Pakistanis rarely last long enough to
systematically discuss the differences between the two sides and how those
differences might be ameliorated or accommodated.
The Indian and Pakistani governments have also tried to influence deeper
perceptions across the border. Several Indian governments have undertaken
major initiatives in an attempt to win over Pakistani opinion. This was especially
the case of non-Congress governments, beginning in 1979 with the prime
minister, Morarji Desai and his foreign minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee.
Subsequently, major initiatives were taken by Inder Kumar Gujral, both when he
was foreign minister and then prime minister; Vajpayee undertook yet another
goodwill mission when he traveled to Lahore in the spring of 1999 to meet with
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Lahore.
These recent efforts seem to have failed dramatically, with the Lahore meeting
discredited by the subsequent Kargil war, and the Nawaz linkage destroyed by the
army coup of October 1999. The Indian proponents of a conciliatory line towards
Pakistan came under strong attack from both the opposition parties and more
hawkish elements of the BJP itself. On Pakistan's part, President Zia's 'cricket
diplomacy' of the late 1980s raised the prospect of a more forthcoming Pakistani
policy.
21
Nevertheless, Pakistan's two democratically elected prime ministers,
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif both assumed a very hawkish policy towards
India, especially after the 1989 uprising in Kashmir.
Several non-regional states and organizations have tried to promote India-
Pakistan cooperation or dialogue. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States
wanted to broker a détente between the two states so that they might join in a
common alliance against threats from the Soviet Union and Communist China.
Considerable diplomatic energy was expended on these efforts but the only
result was to provide each with enhanced diplomatic leverage against the other,
sometimes with ironic results.
In 1949 Nehru had offered Pakistan a 'no war' pact, but Pakistan did not
respond. Then, in 1958, Ayub Khan offered India a 'joint defense' agreement
provided the Kashmir dispute was solved, after which Nehru again reiterated
India's offer of a no-war pact. Several years later, with the US-Pakistan alliance
revived after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, President Zia-ul-Haq offered
Delhi a 'no-war' proposal, flabbergasting the Indians. Of course, neither
proposal was serious, their purpose being to impress outside powers of Indian (or
Pakistani) sincerity.
Much the same can be said of recent proposals for the institution of confidence
building measures (hotlines, summits, dialogues, and various technical
verification proposals) between the two countries. Outsiders regard such
measures as no-risk high-gain arrangements. However, in the India-Pakistan case
cooperation is seen as low-gain and high-risk. If cooperation fails, losses will be
public and politically damaging; there might also be a multiplier effect in that the
