Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
adherents in New Delhi. But if Beijing pursues a moderately prudent and
restrained course in its assistance programs for Pakistan, India will have little
incentive to join a US-led grouping directed against China. New Delhi rightly
recognizes that aligning with the United States in a combination aimed at China
would only encourage Beijing to step up its transfers of threatening technology
to Islamabad, or to take other measures that would create difficulties for India,
such as siding with India's neighbors, including Bangladesh and Burma, who
have disputes with New Delhi, or even supporting secessionist groups in India's
northeast.
Moreover, the improvement in US-India ties over the past several years
appears to have prodded Beijing to repair its own relationship with New Delhi. The
breach in Sino-Indian relations that followed the 1998 nuclear tests has been
largely mended. Barely a year after New Delhi publicly justified its tests by
pointing to a threat from China, the two countries announced the establishment
of a 'strategic dialogue'.
Beijing has also significantly modified its traditional support for Islamabad on
Kashmir. If China continues to display at least a modest level of sensitivity to
Indian concerns, this too will reduce India's compulsion to join with the
Americans in a consortium directed against the Chinese. To the contrary, foreign
entanglements of this sort would strike many Indians as a foolish diversion of
resources from more pressing domestic concerns. As a senior Indian diplomat
recently put it, 'our main priority right now is to develop ourselves, and to stay
clear of international entanglements.'
Doubts about the United States will also limit whatever attractions the idea of
a US-India bloc might otherwise have. New Delhi is not at all certain that its
geostrategic interests are the same as America's, no matter the fine talk about
convergent views. The most likely source of Sino-American conflict over the
next few years, for instance, is Taiwan. But Taiwan is hardly a core concern for
India. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any circumstances where New Delhi
would have a vital interest in a conflict originating in the Taiwan Strait.
In addition, many Indians harbor doubts about the long-term staying power of
the United States. Neither old-style Nehruvians nor steely-eyed realists are
convinced that Washington would be a dependable ally. And the last thing India
would want, in this view, is to adopt an advanced position vis-à-vis China, only
to have the Americans lose interest or change their minds.
In short, although voices calling for closer strategic ties directed against a
rising China can be heard in both India and the United States, calmer heads
counseling restraint are likely to prevail. There is no 'India card' that
Washington might try to play in its competition with Beijing. Moreover, New
Delhi in the coming years will probably find it much more useful to use an
'American card' to foster a more cooperative attitude from China than a 'China
card' to promote closer strategic ties with Washington.
