Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
transfers—underscored Beijing's continued challenge to India's basic security
interests. Recollections of India's humiliating defeat in its 1962 conflict with
China reinforce current strategic concerns, while China's apparent indifference
to Indian desires to resolve their decades-old border disputes fosters additional
suspicions about Chinese intentions. Confronting an unfriendly neighbor along
its northern border, some in India argue, New Delhi would do well to seek a
closer strategic relationship with the United States.
This judgment about the usefulness of a US-India strategic partnership as a
hedge should relations with Beijing sour finds adherents in Washington as well.
Some Americans—in and outside government—appear eager to enlist New
Delhi in an anti-China grouping of some sort. A number of prominent members
of Congress, from both political parties, have publicly called for a closer security
relationship with India for precisely this reason. Former Secretary of the Navy
James Webb, who enjoys close ties to many senior officials in the Bush
administration, has written that the president should more vigorously cultivate
ties with New Delhi since India is 'a natural and historic counterpoint to Chinese
expansionism'.
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Webb may be more forthright in expressing his opinions than
some in Washington, but those opinions are by no means unusual.
Yet, New Delhi would make a mistake to base its policy on the assumption
that the United States is prepared to join forces with India in a partnership aimed
against China. For one thing, while some in Washington believe that China is
destined to become an adversary, this is not the majority opinion, either within
the Bush administration or among Americans generally. Washington, for all the
talk during the presidential campaign about 'strategic competition' with China, is
hardly eager for a more adversarial relationship with Beijing. Witness the annual
votes in Congress on China's trade status, or the speed with which the Bush
administration moved to repair relations with Beijing following the April 2001
standoff over the detention of an American aircrew.
Absent irrefutable evidence of Chinese antagonism, the United States is likely
to be very cautious about creating groupings overtly anti-Chinese in nature. Even
should Washington eventually decide that it has no choice but to assemble an
anti-China coalition, it is not entirely clear that India would be a logical partner.
Mid-level US military officers familiar with Indian capabilities express
bewilderment at the Pentagon's eagerness to accelerate military-to-military
contacts. As an ally, they suggest, New Delhi might represent a strategic liability
as much as an asset.
Nor would most Indians be eager to join with the United States in an anti-
China consortium in which they would inevitably be the junior partner. Of
course India's views on China in the coming years will be heavily influenced by
China's relations with Pakistan, and more specifically, whether Beijing persists
in assisting Islamabad in its nuclear and missile programs. If China continues
such assistance, the idea of a closer partnership with Washington will gain new
