Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
placed India on the short list of its most valued Asian friends. Washington, it
seemed, now gave precedence to India over China on strategic issues.
Armitage's stopover was followed by other senior-level visits in both
directions, including a July trip to India by the chairman of the US joint chiefs of
staff. Many in the Indian press corps could barely restrain their enthusiasm. Gone
were the 'bitter old days' when US 'proliferation absolutists and bleeding-heart
liberals' held the relationship hostage to nuclear issues and human rights
concerns in Kashmir, one commentator crowed.
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The press was filled with
speculation about 'paradigm shifts' and a strategic rapprochement between India
and the United States. Writing in the
Pioneer
at the time of the Armitage visit,
one analyst observed that India had become 'strategically America's natural
choice of ally in the increasingly inevitable battle with Islamic terror'. More
strikingly, he continued: 'The shifting international balance of power will,
therefore, give India an unique status and importance that no other US ally has
enjoyed in the past'.
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The British, Canadians, and Australians, among others,
must have wondered at that.
Second Thoughts
And yet, a closer look behind these breath-taking developments suggested that a
more measured assessment might be in order. While Indians found it gratifying
to have the American president ask Jaswant Singh for his assessment of the
Asian situation, this might have been nothing more than a gracious host placing
the burden of carrying the conversation on his visitor, while allowing the new
and perhaps still-not-fully-briefed Bush to avoid talking with specificity about
US-India relations or any other subject. New Delhi might also have reflected
upon the fact that the American press carried virtually nothing on the Singh visit.
In the eyes of US editors, he was simply one more foreigner making his way to
the capital of the world's mightiest nation, and not worth notice.
Many Indian analysts savored the idea that hereafter, India rather than China
would receive preference, respect, and presidential favor. Here as well, an
apparently pleasing interpretation might be found, upon further examination, to
hold less happy undertones. Did this mean that once again American policy toward
India was little more than the offshoot of US preoccupations with another
power? Was New Delhi valued not in its own right, but largely because of
tensions in the US-China relationship? If so, this was not all that different from
America's unfortunate Cold War insistence on viewing India primarily through
the lens of US-Soviet confrontation.
An unguarded statement by Colin Powell ought to have raised warning flags
of another sort in New Delhi. Speaking with reporters in July, the secretary of
state observed that the administration planned 'to work very hard' with both
India and Pakistan 'to make sure that our relations with both countries are strong
