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Gujarat and to offer American assistance. (The fact that Bush did not telephone
the Chinese president for nearly six months did not escape notice in New Delhi.)
The Pentagon sent a six-member response team to assess the extent of the damage
and followed up with relief supplies and technical assistance. In February 2001,
an American warship participated in an international fleet review in Mumbai. A
few months later, the World Bank, with Washington's backing, approved a new
loan for an expansion of India's power grid, a move that seemed to indicate an
easing of the criteria that since 1998 had restricted the disbursement of aid.
Then there was the Jaswant Singh visit to Washington in April, and Bush's
invitation to the Indian diplomat to continue their chat in the Oval Office. The
president's 'generous and unprecedented gesture of goodwill' (as The Hindu
described it) was read as a signal that Bush had a personal interest in the
relationship. 11 Bush readily accepted an invitation from the Indian prime
minister, delivered through Singh, to visit India. Following a session that
afternoon with the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, Singh reported
that the day's meetings had produced 'substantial' achievements, especially in
the area of military exchanges and cooperation. Pentagon sources shortly
thereafter reported that Rumsfeld had directed his subordinates to look for ways
to restore high-level defense contacts with New Delhi. Pentagon insiders spoke
with reporters of a 'diplomatic revolution' in military-to-military relations
between the two countries. 12
New Delhi's public response to a major presidential address on ballistic
missile defense (BMD) a few weeks later further accelerated the momentum of
the relationship. The Indian government skillfully applauded those parts of the
speech it could endorse—notably, Bush's call for sharp reductions in the number
of nuclear warheads in the Russian and American strategic arsenals, his
endorsement of a shift from offensive to defensive technologies, and his offer to
consult with other countries on a new international security framework. Less
frequently noted was New Delhi's silence on several of the more controversial
aspects of Bush's speech, including the specifics of his missile defense plan and
his willingness, if need be, to abandon the ABM Treaty. Although thus qualified,
the Indian response was nonetheless far more positive than those of most of the
world's other major nations, US friends and potential adversaries alike.
New Delhi's apparent endorsement of the president's BMD plans was
rewarded during the second week of May when Deputy Secretary of State
Armitage stopped in New Delhi to brief Indian officials more thoroughly on
Bush's new policies. Indian analysts described the decision to send Armitage as
further evidence that the Bush administration viewed India as a major strategic
power, a key security interlocutor, and a nation whose opinion mattered, even on
issues not directly related to South Asia. The fact that Armitage's itinerary
included Tokyo, Seoul, and New Delhi but not Beijing or Islamabad was the
occasion of considerable Indian self-congratulation. At last the United States had
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