Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
The French Foreign Affairs Ministry expressed on 13 May its 'preoccupation'
and called for restraint by all states in the region, but found 'encouraging' the
Indian declaration in favor of non-proliferation. The French Defence Minister
added that India seemed to have conducted her tests by relying upon her own
capacity, and that she was not willing to export her technical knowledge. In
addition, the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs declared that the French
government would 'not encourage' the Americans in slapping sanctions against
India, 'because this is not the right way for seeing India joining nations willing to
sign non-proliferation treaties'. This was to no avail of course, for President
Clinton, bound by the Glenn Amendment, imposed the same day sanctions upon
India. But this was more than India could expect. 'A French kiss makes up for
global bitterness', commented
The Economic Times
the next day.
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Effectively, the new BJP-led government was facing at that time strong
condemnation for having opened the nuclear Pandora's box in South Asia.
Russia was as understanding as Paris, but the Yeltsin years were not the best for
Indo-Russian relations. China was stiff, for Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee
had mentioned in his letter to President Clinton 'a northern neighbor' challenging
India's security, a few weeks after his defence minister's controversial definition
of China as 'India's threat number one'. In this context, France's comments were
offering some breathing space to a government whose image was still in doubt,
and which had strained, by conducting nuclear tests, the established relationships
with a number of important partners, such as those with the US, Japan, Germany,
Canada and Australia.
By contrast, the French leadership recognized in India's willingness to strive
for an independent nuclear force a rationale akin to the Gaullist policy of
strategic autonomy implemented by Paris almost 40 years before, and now
accepted by the Left in power. However, this understanding could not be equated
with a blank check. Paris invited India to sign the NPT. It appeared quite a
rhetorical proposal, for the French administration never believed that India—nor
Pakistan after she conducted her own tests on 28 and 30 May—would roll back
their nascent nuclear forces, nor accept the NPT as it stands, because article IX
recognizes only as nuclear weapon states those states who were such in 1967.
More important for Paris was the CTBT, the coming negotiations on the Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and the need for restraint, responsibility,
nonproliferation, and strong command, control and communication facilities.
The political and strategic dialogue envisaged during President Chirac's visit to
New Delhi could now be started with an India who, not recognized as a nuclear
weapon state as per the NPT, was then defining herself, to quote Air Commodore
Jasjit Singh, as 'a state with nuclear weapons'.
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