Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
THE GLOBAL SYSTEMS LEVEL: LIVING WITH
UNIPOLARITY
The end of the Soviet era has meant a radical narrowing of Russia's strategic
purview. Whereas Soviet influence and concern extended to far-flung regions
such as Angola and Nicaragua, such areas have disappeared from Russia's radar
screen. Long accustomed to being defined by its superpower status on the global
stage, Russia's search for a new identity has sent it in different directions at
various times. The central questions revolve around whether Russia perceives
itself first and foremost as a European power or Eurasian one, and what its new
position is within a global system that has effectively gone from bipolarity to
unipolarity.
While Russia has been 'collecting itself'
1
for the past decade, India has had to
craft an entirely new strategic framework with little confidence regarding
Russia's reliability or role
vis-à-vis
the subcontinent. In the process, both
countries have left behind grandiose and ideologically based foreign policy
outlooks and opted for a more pragmatic approach. The Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP)'s pragmatism on foreign policy is well known (exemplified by so-called
nuclear realism) and if there was any doubt regarding Russian views, Putin has
made clear that 'pragmatism' was only second to 'national interests' as a key
principle of Russian foreign policy, followed by 'economic efficiency'.
2
During the Cold War years, many strategic analysts in India liked to point out
a distinction they detected between Soviet and American approaches to India: for
the US, relations with India were derivative from the superpower conflict
whereas the Soviets appreciated India for its own worth. Post-Cold War, such a
sanguine view regarding the Russians seems to have been misplaced or at least
overstated. As the historic Russian transformation got underway, India found
itself with severe disadvantages, having had intimate ties to the old Soviet Union
and few friends among Russia's so-called new democrats who were swept to
power with Boris Yeltsin.
Within the Russian establishment, the Foreign Ministry under the pro-western
Andrei Kozyrev relegated India to a secondary role. During this initial phase
which was to last until 1996, India was forced to take the initiative to try to build
new bridges to the Duma and utilize earlier Soviet lobbies. India was able to
exploit lobbies against Kozyrev's tilt which had formed in the Russian
Federation presidential apparatus, and was aided by such figures as Vladimir
Lukin in the Soviet who called for greater attention to be paid to old allies.
There were also economic lobbies who wanted a piece of the Rupee-Ruble
account balances which had accumulated in India. India's Ambassador to
Russia, Ronen Sen, was an old Russian hand and took the lead in trying to push
India to retain its Russia tilt.
3
Yet the Congress government under
P.V.Narasimha Rao had no real choice but to diversify India's security links as
