Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions - India as an Emerging Power - page 114

Indian tests was to 'strengthen a bit its hegemonist position in South Asia, and
especially use the nuclear tests to secure a position equal to that of the…five
nuclear big powers'. 18
An article by another authoritative Chinese South Asian specialist, Ye
Zhengjia argued along similar lines. India's use of 'the China threat' (the term
was always put inside quotation marks) was a 'pretext' designed to win Western
sympathy and thereby minimize adverse Western reaction to the nuclear tests.
India's leaders 'clearly understood', Ye said, that China's nuclear weapons were
entirely for self defense and that it was 'inconceivable' that they could ever be
used against India. Likewise, 'the assertion that Sino-Pakistan cooperation
threatened India is preposterous'. 19
Other articles by Chinese analysts did perceive Indian threats to China. One
article maintained that turning Tibet into a 'buffer zone' (huang chong guo)
between India and China was still the long term objective of Indian military
strategy against China. Regarding India's nuclear weapons and missile
programs, 'as everyone knows', those weapons were 'mainly directed against
China'. India also objected to Sino-Pakistan military cooperation and this could
also threaten China's security interests. Because of this, one 'could not exclude
the possibility of a worsening' of Sino-Indian relations. In spite of all this,
however, the author insisted that India's use of 'the 'China threat' anti-China
clamor' in May 1998 was merely a 'pretext'. 20
Still another article laid out a very realistic view of Indian perceptions of
security challenges associated with China. Interesting, the piece began and ended
with politically correct, unequivocal rejections of 'the China threat' theory. 21
Thus even with the more hard-headed, realistic minority analysts, one got a sense
that application of a security perspective to Sino-Indian relations was misplaced.
The message was that if only Indian leaders would abandon their unfounded
fears of China, Sino-Indian friendship could blossom.
THE MOBILIZATION FUNCTION OF CHINESE OPEN
MEDIA
Analysis at the level of bureaucratic process provides a satisfactory if partial
explanation of the dearth of Chinese expressions of concern about security
challenges from India. The reader will have noticed that all previous discussions
of Chinese perceptions of India were based on publicly available, openly
published Chinese sources. China's two defense white papers issued by the PRC
State Council, Guoji wenti yanjiu, Xiandai guoji guanxi, Beijing Review, Renmin
ribao, Nanya yanjiu, Nanya yanjiu jikan, and Guoji zhanlue yanjiu, are all open-
source, freely distributed publications. Correct interpretation of the messages
conveyed by these sources requires understanding of the function of such media
in China.