Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
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What does effective deterrence entail in terms of the numbers of nuclear
weapons?
•
What does effective deterrence entail in terms of the quality of nuclear
weapons?
•
What does effective deterrence entail in terms of the numbers and quality
of
delivery systems?
•
What is the 'dominant' solution to the problem of strategic force
survivability?
•
How slow can 'delayed retaliation' be without imperiling deterrence
stability?
•
How formal do C
3
I systems have to be for effective deterrence?
•
How important is military custody of nuclear weapons in peacetime for
effective deterrence?
•
Is stable deterrence best served by certainty or uncertainty of strategic
outcomes?
Depending on how the answers to these questions change over time, the Indian
strategic posture could mutate—and although previous discussions posited a
ready arsenal as the 'ideal-typical' alternative strategic managers in New Delhi
might favor, this choice, like any other, may never be publicly announced or
deliberately selected, but may instead appear simply as the end point of a long
process of creeping weaponization.
It is thus worth noting—more from a policy standpoint than from a theoretical
perspective—that there are some intermediate positions India may pause at along
the way.
106
As
Figure 12
suggests, at one end, India could continue to settle for a force-in-
being, but one that is
not
limited in size. This posture—a robust force-in-being—
would continue to be defined by separated components and centralized control,
but it would seek to incorporate the largest and most capable nuclear force India
could produce before it is constrained either by bilateral agreements or by
multilateral treaties.
At the other end, India could opt for a modest ready arsenal—that is, a force
defined by highly integrated weapons ready for prompt operations as well as by a
centralized but rapidly devolving command-and-control system, yet one that is
nonetheless small at least in terms of the number and perhaps types of nuclear
weapons it involves. Beyond these two sub-alternatives, of course, lies a true and
robust ready arsenal, which may be described as a large nuclear force that is fully
integrated in disposition, with centralized but rapidly devolving command-and-
control arrangements.
Since it is impossible to predict whether India will choose to move directly to
a ready arsenal of this kind—once it feels compelled to go beyond its current
preference for a force-in-being—or even if it will choose to move in decisive as
