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put heavy import and export sanctions on the Gaza Strip. The goal was to keep the Hamas
regime weak and, if possible, bring it down through a loss of public support. The Turkish
Islamist IHH group organized a six-ship fl otilla, ostensibly to bring humanitarian aid to the
Gaza Strip. Because its political goal was to help Hamas by breaking the sanctions, the orga-
nizers refused an offer to bring the aid to Israel's port of Ashdod, where it would be checked
and then transported into Gaza. On May 31, to prevent the ships from landing in Gaza, Israeli
forces boarded fi ve of the ships and steered them into Ashdod without injury. But about forty
Turks associated with Islamist groups violently resisted attempts by Israeli navy commandos
to board the sixth ship, the
Mavi Marmara
fl agship, and took some soldiers hostage. In the
ensuing gunfi ght, nine Turkish jihadists were killed.
From the organizers' standpoint, the fl otilla was a success. The incident led to much inter-
national criticism of Israel; and the Islamist government in Turkey, which had already moved
to end the previous close relations between the two countries, became outspokenly hostile.
Particularly because of U.S. pressure, Israel narrowed its sanctions to ban just the smuggling
of weapons and items of military use. The lifting of these sanctions, along with the infl ow of
foreign aid, facilitated the survival of the Hamas regime, with its stated goal of destroying Israel
and sabotaging any Israel-PA peace process.
The dramatic developments in the region during 2011 only confi rmed the post-2000 Is-
raeli worldview that there was no partner for peace, that Western security guarantees were not
trustworthy, and that revolutionary Islamist forces determined to attack and desiring to wipe
out Israel were increasingly powerful in the Middle East. Where many Western observers per-
ceived an “Arab Spring” of moderate democratic change, Israelis saw — especially in Egypt — a
growing extremism, even the undoing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty.
In an indicative June 2010 poll, 77 percent of Israelis opposed returning to the pre-1967
boundaries even if that led to a peace agreement; 85 percent wanted to maintain a united Je-
rusalem under Israeli sovereignty in any peace deal. About 60 percent believed that defensible
borders were more likely to ensure peace than any peace agreement, while 82 percent con-
sidered security concerns more important than any diplomatic deal. All of these fi gures had
climbed upward because of this worldview shift following the failure of the 1993 -2000 Oslo
peace process, the ensuing intifada, and other developments.
Assessing the overall situation of Israel in the early twenty-fi rst century involves both
positive developments and problems. The threat that had prevailed for many decades —
conventional warfare against a broad alliance of neighboring and other Arab states —has re-
ceded. Israel has developed into a prosperous society with a military that has demonstrated its
edge over potential foes. It has strong defenses against terrorism and is developing a multilevel
defense system against rockets and missiles. The number of rocket attacks on Israel from the
Gaza Strip declined from 2,048 in 2008 to 569 in 2009 and to 150 in 2010. Despite the absence
of a diplomatic process, the situation in the West Bank remained generally stable, and Israeli
countermeasures — including the security fence —kept terrorism at low levels. The total num-
ber of attacks on Israel— including those from the Gaza Strip — declined from 1,354 in 2009
to 798 in 2010.
At the same time, however, the Arab nationalist antagonists —both states and radical
groups —have been replaced by revolutionary Islamists determined to sustain the confl ict
