Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
Israeli leaders see the Fatah-dominated West Bank PA as the lesser of two evils. Even if they
doubted that peace could be made with the PA, Israeli leaders knew that its PA counterparts
wanted to survive Hamas's challenge and avoid renewed warfare. Israel used its intelligence
service, military forces, and economic leverage to help achieve this goal.
Following a November 2007 meeting in Annapolis, Maryland, hosted by the United
States, Israel-PA talks restarted, as did indirect exchanges with Syria. Here, too, Israeli leaders
doubted that Syria intended to make a deal, but exchanges were nonetheless seen as a way to
show Israel's desire for peace, satisfy the United States, and give Syria an incentive to restrain
Hizballah.
After taking over the Gaza Strip, Hamas stepped up its campaign of cross-border raids and
rocket and mortar attacks on Israel. During 2008, Hamas fi red 1,700 rockets at southern Israel.
While casualties were low, life in the region was severely disrupted, and by the end of 2008,
fi fteen Israeli civilians had been killed.
Israel frequently retaliated after the attacks. It also periodically and temporarily blocked
the shipping of goods other than food or medicine into the Gaza Strip because Hamas was
using imports to consolidate its rule and to strengthen its military capacity. Israel's minimum
goal was to keep the Hamas regime weak and unstable; its maximum goal was to topple the
regime.
In June 2008, Hamas agreed under pressure to a six-month ceasefi re, but it used the time
to smuggle in weapons, usually through tunnels passing through the porous Egyptian border
blockade. It allowed such smaller allied groups as the Islamic Jihad to violate the ceasefi re by
continuing to fi re rockets and mortars at Israel. Hamas also rejected Israeli offers to release
hundreds of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Shalit, the captured IDF soldier.
In December 2008, Hamas announced that it was ending the ceasefi re and began shooting
large numbers of rockets into Israel again. Consequently, on December 27, Israel launched Op-
eration Cast Lead, an aerial campaign against Hamas targets, which was followed by a ground
attack on January 3. On January 17, Israel declared a unilateral ceasefi re, to which Hamas re-
sponded by announcing a cessation of rocket attacks for one week. Israel's troops were out of
the Gaza Strip four days later.
Operation Cast Lead was quick and focused, and Israeli casualties were minimal. Unlike
Hizballah, Hamas did not fi ght well. It also suffered heavy casualties and had major losses of
equipment. In this brief Gaza War, Israeli deterrence was reestablished, and Hamas was forced
to be more cautious about attacking Israel thereafter. But Hamas was not forced out of power
and was not hit as hard as it could have been, because the Israeli government decided not to
go into the most densely populated areas where Hamas troops were hiding. It wished to avoid
heavy casualties both in its own army and among Palestinian civilians.
International reaction to the offensive was another consideration. Frequently before, in
Israel's confl icts with the PLO and Arab states, the West — including the United States —had
moved to prevent a full Israeli victory. Israel did not want to open its relationship with the
newly elected U.S. president, Barack Obama, with friction.
Unable to beat Israel on the regular battlefi eld, Hamas tried different tactics. It used Pal-
estinian civilians as human shields by placing the main Hamas headquarters in a hospital
