Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
The UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1701 for a ceasefi re on Au-
gust 11, 2006. The resolution called for the Lebanese army's deployment along the border and
the creation of a greatly expanded UN force to block Hizballah's return to the south and its
building of fortifi cations there. In addition, the UN force was assigned to help the Lebanese
government block Hizballah's arms imports from Syria and even to disarm the Hizballah mi-
litia. None of these steps were taken, augmenting Israelis' disillusionment with the pledges of
Western governments and international organizations.
Israeli troops generally succeeded in their intense combat with Hizballah, though with high
casualties. Preventing Hizballah from fi ring the highly mobile rockets proved especially diffi -
cult. Overall, 119 Israeli soldiers were killed in the fi ghting, and 43 Israeli civilians died in rocket
attacks. Around 1,000 Lebanese died, of whom Israel estimated 600 were Hizballah fi ghters.
Although Israel defeated the Hizballah forces, showed that it could send troops into Lebanon
at will, and killed a high proportion of Hizballah's active-duty soldiers, many in the Arab world
celebrated the war as a strategic victory because Hizballah had survived, caused Israeli casual-
ties, and showed its ability to strike within Israel using rockets.
Israelis were dissatisfi ed with the government's performance. Demobilized reserve IDF sol-
diers demonstrated, demanding an investigation. A protest tent was set up close to the prime
minister's offi ce. Under public pressure, Olmert accepted the necessity of an investigation;
Judge Eliyahu Winograd headed the investigating committee.
The committee's interim report of April 30, 2007, was harshly critical of Olmert, Peretz, and
Halutz, the last of whom had already resigned in January. Both Olmert and Peretz refused to
resign. Olmert was aware that few in his party wanted new elections, since polls indicated that
Kadima would not do well. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni was widely criticized in the media for
her perceived indecisiveness. Despite criticizing Olmert, she refused to resign or to battle him
for the leadership, which helped defl ate the campaign for Olmert's removal. A large demon-
stration on May 3, 2007, of 100,000 calling for Olmert's resignation came to nothing, and the
protest campaign faded.
Peretz was not so fortunate. Primaries to choose the Labor Party's leader had long been
scheduled for May 29. Barak, claiming that only he with his centrist and security credentials
could beat Netanyahu in an election, gained a majority in the second round. He became de-
fense minister in Olmert's government while making it clear that he believed Olmert should
resign.
A NEW NATIONAL CONSENSUS
For many Israelis on both the left and right, the events of the summer of 2006 discredited the
strategy of unilateral withdrawals. The fl aw in the policy seemed to be its inability to create de-
terrence. Unilateral withdrawals appeared to persuade the other side that Israel was weak and
in retreat; aggressive attacks were the result, not steps toward peace. Iran's and Syria's spon-
sorship of Palestinian and Lebanese groups that rejected Israel's existence made the situation
threatening, since land from which Israel withdrew came under the infl uence of such groups.
Even Kadima's leaders acknowledged that any more disengagement steps had to be taken off
the agenda.
