Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
An IDF vehicle patrolling the security fence to stop terrorists crossing from the West Bank into Israel, October
2008. (Jorge Novominsky.)
the nature of the terrain, the fence did not always follow the 1967 frontier — only 19 percent of
the public thought it should —but Israel's government made it clear that the fence was in no
way intended to mark a future border and could be moved if necessary after any future agree-
ment on borders.
Although the fence attracted international criticism, it did protect Israelis. Successful Pal-
estinian attacks into Israel fell sharply, and the cabinet approved the second stage of con-
struction, costing $1 billion, in September 2003. The fence shielded 80 percent of the Jews
living in the West Bank— those in the large Jewish settlements adjacent to the 1967 boundary
lines —but placed only 8 percent of the West Bank territory on the Israeli side of the bar-
rier. Most settlements remained outside the fence. Lawsuits by West Bank Palestinians in the
Israeli Supreme Court and urgings by the United States brought route changes on several
occasions.
On the security fence issue, as with the allegations of a massacre at Jenin and as in many
other instances, international criticism promoted solidarity among Israelis. They perceived
the criticism as made without evidence and as indicating disinterest in Israeli security. When
in July 2004, for example, the majority of judges on the International Court of Justice issued
a nonbinding judgment condemning the security barrier and calling for it to be dismantled,
their statement mentioned terrorism only twice. Immediately after the decision, 78 percent of
Israelis said they favored the fence, and 62 percent added that it improved their personal sense
of security.
